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Obamacare Interrupted:                   
Obstructive Federalism and the Consumer 
Information Blockade  
KATHERINE T. VUKADIN† 
I deem [one of] the essential principles of our 
Government . . . the diffusion of information.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)2 aims to deliver cost-
effective health insurance to Americans while decreasing the 
cost of care and improving outcomes. These aspirations mean 
little, however, unless accurate information about the ACA 
reaches its key stakeholders: consumers.  
The ACA allows the states to embrace or reject some of 
the law’s most significant tenets; one widely-criticized 
rejection is the southern states’ refusal to expand Medicaid. 
Less well known and little criticized, however, is the quiet 
  
† Associate Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas 
Southern University. J.D., The University of Texas School of Law, B.A., 
University of Houston. I thank the readers who gave their insights during the 
discussion of this Article at the 2015 AALS meeting. Professor Sidney D. Watson 
provided thoughtful comments, for which I am most grateful. I thank Davor 
Vukadin and Anne Traverse for their constant support. Thurgood Marshall 
School of Law generously provided a summer research grant for this Article.    
1.  Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp. 
2.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.), was signed into law on 
March 23, 2010; the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.), was 
signed into law on March 30, 2010. These two bills will be referred to as the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) or the Act in this Article, and, for the ease of the 
reader, all citations will be to the final ACA bill if possible.  
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rejection of a second, equally significant underpinning of the 
ACA: informational transparency for consumers. The ACA 
contains a network of provisions designed to revolutionize 
health insurance by permitting previously-unknown 
information to flow freely. Provision after provision of the 
ACA reflects a deep-seated faith in the role of information 
dissemination and collection, which permits informed 
consumer choices and targeted enforcement of consumer 
protections. The states can, however, opt out of many 
consumer information provisions. At the same time, the 
states cannot opt out of the federally-implemented individual 
and employer mandates and the associated penalties; these 
penalties remain a constant, applying equally to every 
American regardless of state recalcitrance.  
This Article posits that the states rejecting the ACA’s 
consumer information provisions are thereby relegating their 
citizens to a second-class ACA status, in which the ACA’s 
penalties apply but the benefits remain elusive. Under those 
states’ obstructive federalism approach, their citizens remain 
subject to the ACA’s federal costs and penalties but their 
access to health insurance is threatened by lack of 
information. While some of the provisions have a federal 
fallback, the federal government is ill-equipped to take on the 
full burden of implementation, and federal intrusion is 
particularly unwelcome in these states. So that the ACA’s 
benefits are more consistently available to Americans of 
every state, citizens and policy-makers in recalcitrant states 
should advocate for informational transparency and full 
information for consumers, just as stakeholders are pushing 
for the Medicaid expansion in those states. While a federal 
fallback exists for some aspects of the ACA, the effective 
provision of consumer information requires state 
participation and should not be ceded to the federal 
government.  
Part I summarizes the ACA’s goals and the informational 
transparency provisions designed to help accomplish the 
goals; Part II explains certain states’ obstructive federalism 
and how these states are ignoring or undermining the ACA’s 
transparency provisions; and Part III describes the perverse, 
secondary results of this rejection and possible means of 
ameliorating these outcomes. 
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I. THE ACA’S GOALS AND INFORMATIONAL TRANSPARENCY 
The ACA aims to increase health insurance enrollment 
and improve healthcare costs and outcomes. Controversial 
from the start, the law’s passage required a cooperative 
federalism approach,3 by which the federal government and 
the states would each have significant roles. Alongside this 
commitment to cooperative federalism, the ACA reflects its 
drafters’ belief in the power of informational transparency to 
accomplish a variety of health insurance and healthcare 
goals. The ACA’s success depends on cooperative federalism 
and the free flow of information. 
A. A Foundation in Informational Transparency 
The ACA employs informational transparency to 
accomplish goals extending from improved access to 
affordable health insurance to better public health through 
disclosure of nutritional information. Provision after 
provision calls for the gathering, disclosure, or exchange of 
information. This emphasis on informational transparency 
stems from the ACA’s drafters’ faith in the power of 
information’s free flow to bring about health reform.4 The 
drafters envisioned informational transparency operating at 
  
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
 4. Bending the curve of healthcare costs and enhancing information sharing 
“will first require the administration and private parties to work together to 
exchange real-time information to support care and also to enable better 
measurement of cost and quality of care at the individual-level, empowering 
specific clinical transformation efforts.” Joseph Antos, et al., Bending the Curve 
Through Health Reform Implementation, 16 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 804, 808 
(2010). ACA architect Ezekiel Emanuel, M.D., Ph.D., referred to transparency as 
an “imperative,” so that patients can learn about the cost of healthcare services 
and the quality of the providers before undergoing treatment. Robert P. Kocher 
& Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Transparency Imperative, 159 ANNALS INT’L MED. 296, 
296 (2013) (“All data on price, utilization, and quality of health care should be 
made available to the public unless there is a compelling reason not to do so.”). At 
present, patients have tremendous difficulty finding out the price of a procedure 
in advance—“obtaining such information is almost impossible.” Id. In addition, 
Kocher and Emanuel argue that to make an informed decision about whether and 
with whom to have a procedure, patients need to know how many such procedures 
a potential provider has performed. Id. (“Physician case volume is one of the most 
important predictors of quality for many surgeries and medical conditions.”).  
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numerous levels; the ACA reflects this vision, with 
transparency of information for healthcare prices,5 health 
insurance value information, and insurance price increase 
information.6 And, where relationships and the exchange of 
money and gifts can influence decision-making, those 
relationships and exchanges should be disclosed.7  
But informational transparency in the ACA is much 
broader than that. As described below, the ACA includes 
transparency provisions designed to connect consumers with 
their benefits, enforcement officials with appropriate targets, 
and the public with information about health insurance 
pricing practices.  
B. How Informational Transparency Accomplishes the    
  ACA’s Main Goals 
Informational transparency provisions help consumers 
access the information necessary to claim their rights, while 
other provisions call for the disclosure of information to shed 
light on less desirable practices and relationships. While 
some of the informational transparency provisions operate 
without state assistance, others count the state governments 
as first-line implementers. 
  
 5. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, In Health Care, Choice Is Overrated, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/opinion/in-health-care-choice-is-
overrated.html?_r=0 (“[W]e need more transparency. Insurance companies 
should have to publish the measures they use to select their ‘high performing’ or 
‘efficient’ networks. This will discourage them from looking at price alone.”); 
Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach to Containing Healthcare Spending, 
367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949 (2012).  
 6. Early in the health care reform discussions, ACA architect and Senate 
Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.) argued that transparency 
should a key part of the proposed law. SEN. MAX BAUCUS, CALL TO ACTION: HEALTH 
REFORM 2009 69-70 (2008), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/download/
?id=916b0ea3-96dc-4c7a-bb35-241fa822367e. He envisioned transparency 
extending to the price of health insurance, including employer plans, and outcome 
information. See id. at 65. 
 7. Id. at 70. 
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1. Affordable, Available Health Insurance Through   
  Exchanges, Outreach, and Education  
The ACA aims to make high-quality, affordable health 
insurance more available and to bring immediate 
improvements to all health care coverage.8 With the full 
Medicaid expansion as originally planned, the ACA would 
have covered thirty-two million of the previously-uninsured,9 
  
 8. See ACA Title I. As enacted and if fully implemented, the ACA would have 
covered 32 million of the 50 million Americans without health insurance.                  
J. Angelo DeSantis & Gabriel Ravel, The Consequence of Repealing Health Care 
Reform in Early 2013, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 365, 376 (2012). Of those left without 
insurance, 19 million would be non-elderly adults, as follows:  
Thirty-seven percent—mostly young singles without dependents—would 
be eligible for Medicaid, but not enrolled; Twenty-five percent would be 
undocumented immigrants; Sixteen percent would be exempt from the 
individual mandate because they would not have an affordable insurance 
option; Eight percent would be eligible for affordable subsidized coverage 
in the health benefit exchanges; The remaining 15 percent—most higher-
income families with dependents—would likely be subject to the 
mandate, having an affordable private insurance option despite not 
qualifying for a subsidy.  
MATTHEW BUETTGENS & MARK A. HALL, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., WHO 
WILL BE UNINSURED AFTER HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM? (2011), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-research/2011/03/who-
will-be-uninsured-after-health-insurance-reform-.html. In 2010, about 16.3% of 
the U.S. population, or 49.9 million people, had no health insurance coverage. 
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: OVERVIEW OF THE UNINSURED IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A SUMMARY OF THE 2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1-2 (2011), 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/CPSHealthIns2011/ib.pdf. 
 9. JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 109-10 (Univ. of 
Cal. Press 2011). The ACA was never intended to provide universal coverage; 
even if fully implemented, the ACA would leave millions uninsured. Mark A. Hall, 
Evaluating the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 HOU. L. REV. 1029, 
1033 (2014) (citing Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, 
to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/amendreconprop.pdf). The 
letter provides Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) and Joint Committee on 
Taxation (“JCT”) estimates that by 2019, the combined effect of enacting H.R. 
3590 and the reconciliation proposal would be “to reduce the number of nonelderly 
people who are uninsured by about 32 million, leaving about 23 million nonelderly 
residents uninsured (about one-third of whom would be unauthorized 
immigrants). Under the legislation, the share of legal nonelderly residents with 
insurance coverage would rise from about 83 percent currently to about 94 
percent.” Elmendorf, supra, at 9.  
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while bringing down the cost of both health insurance and 
health care itself.10 The ACA uses a multi-pronged approach 
to accomplish these goals, relying on mechanisms enacted 
directly as part of the ACA as well as indirect mechanisms, 
enacted as part of the ACA but then implemented through 
financial incentives to the states. One principal strategy for 
making health insurance more affordable is the ACA’s direct 
financial support to lower income Americans. The ACA 
provides premium reductions11 and also cost sharing 
subsidies,12 available at income levels of up to 400% of the 
federal poverty level.13 So that lower income Americans are 
more able to afford health insurance, the ACA provides 
payments directly to insurers.14 Premium subsidies provide a 
tax credit for lower-income Americans who purchase health 
  
 10. See MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 109-10, 176-77. 
 11. Individuals are eligible for the premium tax credits if: 
(1) they are not eligible for employer-provided coverage or for a public 
health insurance program; (2) they are US citizens or lawful residents of 
the United States; (3) they are not incarcerated; and (4) their modified 
AGI is 100-400 percent of poverty (about $11,500-$46,000 for an 
individual and $23,000-$94,000 for a family of four in 2013). Lawfully 
present immigrants with incomes below 100 percent of poverty are also 
eligible if they do not qualify for Medicaid because of immigration status 
(for example, if they arrived in the United States during the past five 
years). To be eligible, individuals must file a federal tax return in 2015 
(a joint return if married) and not be claimed as a dependent on anyone 
else’s return. The premium tax credit can be used to purchase coverage 
for all people claimed as dependents on the tax return.  
Julia James, Health Policy Brief: Premium Tax Credits, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 2-3 
(Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter James, Premium Tax Credits], 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=97.  
 12. Out-of-pocket costs are subsidized for lower-income families. If a family of 
four earns between 100 and 150% of the federal poverty level, the family is 
responsible for paying 6% of covered expenses out-of-pocket, as compared with 
the 30% that a non-subsidized family would pay. If the family earns more—
between 200 and 250% of poverty—then out-of-pocket spending is capped at 
$2,250 for individuals and $4,500 for family coverage, as opposed to the $6,350, 
for individuals, or $12,700, for families, for non-subsidized coverage. ACA §§ 
1401-02. 
 13. Id. § 1401 (codified at I.R.C § 36B (2012)); § 1402(b)(2). 
 14. Id. § 1402(c)(3)(A). 
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insurance, and cost sharing subsidies limit the amounts that 
lower income Americans pay out of pocket for health care.15 
Several provisions ensure that consumers receive good 
value when they purchase health insurance. To be considered 
a “qualified health plan,” meaning a plan that can be offered 
on an exchange, a health plan must include certain minimum 
coverage provisions.16 And, through new medical loss ratio 
rules, an insurer must refund premium dollars to insured 
persons if the company spends less than 85 or 80% of 
premiums on medical-related expenses—in addition, 
companies must report their medical loss ratio to the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and to 
the public.17 The ACA also makes health insurance more 
available by ensuring that Americans are not refused health 
insurance due to pre-existing conditions and that prices are 
not increased on the basis of gender or on any other basis 
except those specified.18 In addition, health insurance issuers 
must accept all individuals and employers who apply.19 
Young adults can remain covered on a parent’s health 
insurance until age twenty-six.20  
Transparency and consumer outreach are important 
means of accomplishing these goals. Consumer outreach 
  
 15. See id. § 1402; see also MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 124 (“Premium 
subsidies are needed so that the cost of purchasing health insurance does not take 
too much out of a family’s household budget. It’s not good enough, though, to 
reduce premiums to an affordable level if the coverage requires co-payments, 
deductibles, or co-insurance that prevents individuals and families from 
obtaining necessary medical care.”). 
 16. The services required to be covered include ambulatory patient services, 
emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health 
and substance abuse services including behavioral health treatment, prescription 
drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory services, 
preventative and wellness services and chronic disease management, pediatric 
services, including oral and vision care. ACA § 1302. 
 17. Id. § 2718. 
 18. See id. § 2701(a)(1) (stating that insurers may not discriminate on the basis 
of gender and describing other bases for price differences). 
 19. See id. § 2702(a) (stating that “each health insurance issuer that offers 
health insurance coverage in the individual or group market in a State must 
accept every employer and individual in the State that applies for such coverage”). 
 20. Id. § 2714(a). 
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begins with a centralized place to shop and compare plans: 
the health insurance exchanges.21 The exchanges aim to drive 
down health insurance prices by allowing consumers to 
review relevant prices information and comparison shop in a 
centralized market for health insurance policies.22 Not only 
can consumers compare prices, but they can learn the total 
premium revenue spent on nonclinical costs, so that they can 
judge which policy provides better value.23  
States are invited to set up their own exchanges, 
potentially adding in their own transparency requirements 
and promoting their exchanges on their own websites. 
California has done just that, requiring price transparency 
measures as a condition of joining the exchange.24  
The federally-facilitated exchange (“FFE”) at 
healthcare.gov discloses information regarding available 
plans, rate premium information, and summary information 
about covered benefits and cost sharing, together with other 
useful information.25 Enforcement of these provisions is 
  
 21. See id. § 1321; Joshua Phares Ackerman, The Unintended Federalism 
Consequences of the Affordable Care Act’s Insurance Market Reforms, 34 PACE L. 
REV. 273, 273 (2014) (noting that the federal government operates an exchange 
in any state without one). 
 22. ACA § 1103; Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the 
Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 394, 
434 (2014) (noting that transparency provisions of the ACA will allow consumers 
to comparison shop for plans based on factors such as quality, access, and 
premiums). 
 23. ACA § 1103(b). Health plans are required to adopt certain standards for 
their transactions to keep administration as simple as possible. See id. § 1104. 
The exchange rules require health insurers offering group or individual health 
insurance coverage to account for their costs on an annual basis, by disclosing the 
amount spent on reimbursement for clinical services provided, on activities that 
improve health care, and on “all other non-claim costs.” Id. § 2718(a).  
 24. See COVERED CAL., DRAFT HEALTH PLAN CONTRACT 11-12 (2013), available 
at http://hbex.coveredca.com/solicitations/QHP/library/Clean%20version%20v4%
20QHP%20Model%20Contract.pdf. 
 25. How to Choose Marketplace Insurance, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). The 
website will also offer information such as the percentage of policies rescinded, 
the percentage of claims denied, and the number and disposition of appealed and 
denied claims. Karen Pollitz & Larry Levitt, Health Insurance Transparency 
Under the Affordable Care Act, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Mar. 
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planned to be a cooperative process involving compliance 
assistance and cooperation with the states.26 
The exchanges’ existence, however, does not guarantee 
success if consumers stay away. To succeed, the ACA 
requires uptake and enrollment, which in turn requires that 
consumers know about as well as understand their choices 
and rights. Many consumers, however, know little about the 
ACA, and a significant number even believe it has been 
repealed.27 Individuals can only enroll in the health 
insurance through the ACA if they know that the opportunity 
exists. Additional ACA provisions therefore aim to make 
available the information that consumers need to obtain 
coverage and make informed decisions. 
One of the ACA’s means of disseminating information is 
through direct outreach. The ACA, together with subsequent 
regulations, provides for a number of individuals who can 
inform consumers about health insurance options under the 
ACA, assist with enrollment, and help potential enrollees 
determine any applicable subsidies. These assistance roles 
are subject to state or federal oversight through training, 
  
8, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/perspective/health-insurance-transparency-
under-the-affordable-care-act; see ACA § 1311(e). 
 26. The departments intend to work cooperatively with the states in 
enforcement; their approach is to work “together with employers, issuers, States, 
providers and other stakeholders to help them come into compliance with the new 
law and [to work] with families and individuals to help them understand the new 
law and benefit from it, as intended. Compliance assistance is a high priority for 
the Departments.” Affordable Care Act Implementation FAQs-Set 14, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-
Sheets-and-FAQs/aca_implementation_faqs14.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
 27. According to one poll, only fifty-nine percent of people overall knew that 
the ACA was the law of the land and would be implemented, while the rest were 
not sure. Phil Galewitz, 10 States Are Critical to Administration’s Efforts to Enroll 
6 Million in New Health Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 19, 2014) 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2014/March/19/10-states-are-critical-
to-administrations-efforts-to-enroll-6-million-in-new-health-plans.aspx; Kaiser 
Health Tracking Poll April 2013, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 30, 
2013) [hereinafter Kaiser Health Tracking Poll April 2013], http://kff.org/health-
reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-april-2013. 
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certification, and approval, and then through ongoing 
oversight.28  
Certified Application Counselors. Exchanges are 
required to have a certified application counselor program, 
which is developed by designating organizations to certify 
counselors or by directly certifying counselors or members of 
other organizations.29 Certified application counselors are 
assistance personnel available to give information to 
consumers and help them enroll in qualified health plans and 
insurance affordability programs.30 Counselors’ duties and 
obligations—as well as the standards for certifying 
counselors—are regulated.31 To be designated as part of the 
certified application counselor program, an organization 
must have experience providing social services to the 
community, must engage in services that position them to 
help those they serve with health coverage issues, and have 
processes in place that screen their staff members and 
volunteers so as to protect personally identifiable 
information.32 To be designated, organizations must first 
apply to the federally-facilitated marketplace.33 The 
exchange both oversees counselors and creates a procedure 
to retract certification if a counselor violates the rules.34  
Navigators. In addition, an exchange must create a 
navigator program.35 Navigators are trained to provide free 
  
 28. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.225 (2014); see generally St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. 
Huff, 996 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Mo. 2014). 
 29. 45 C.F.R. § 155.225(a)–(b)(2). 
 30. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., GUIDANCE ON CERTIFIED 
APPLICATION COUNSELOR PROGRAM FOR THE FEDERALLY-FACILITATED 
MARKETPLACE INCLUDING STATE PARTNERSHIP MARKETPLACES (2013) [hereinafter 
CMS, CERTIFIED APPLICATION COUNSELORS], available at http://www.cms.gov/
CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/CAC-guidance-7-12-
2013.pdf. 
 31. 45 C.F.R. § 155.225(d). 
 32. CMS, CERTIFIED APPLICATION COUNSELORS, supra note 30, at 2. 
 33. Id. at 2-3. 
 34. 45 C.F.R. § 155.225(e). 
 35. ACA § 1311(d)(4)(k); 45 C.F.R. § 155.210(a) (stating that an exchange 
“must establish a [federal] Navigator program . . . through which it awards grants 
to eligible public or private entities or individuals.”). 
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information about health coverage options to consumers, 
small businesses, and their employees.36 They are funded 
through federal and state grants.37 Through these programs 
and personnel, potential enrollees can learn about their 
options on the exchanges, find out about any available 
subsidies, and receive help with the actual application 
process. 
Non-Navigator Personnel. Personnel from states with 
successful outreach programs emphasize the need for 
outreach and contact on a personal, one-to-one basis,38 with 
outreach personnel reaching potential enrollees where they 
are. This means that navigators and other outreach 
personnel can most effectively reach potential enrollees not 
by staying in their offices, but by providing information at 
sports events, schools, community health centers, grocery 
stores, and places of leisure.39   
Consumer information provisions are therefore a crucial 
part of the ACA’s fundamental goal of increasing the number 
of Americans with health insurance. 
  
 36. Navigator, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/
navigator (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).  
 37. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASSISTANCE ROLES TO HELP CONSUMERS 
APPLY & ENROLL IN HEALTH COVERAGE THROUGH THE MARKETPLACE (2013), 
available at http://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/files/downloads/marketplace-
ways-to-help.pdf (“Navigators will have a vital role in helping consumers prepare 
electronic and paper applications to establish eligibility and enroll in coverage 
through the Marketplace.”). 
 38. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PREPARING FOR OUTREACH AND 
ENROLLMENT UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: LESSONS FROM THE STATES 17 
(2013), available at https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/
092413_kff_outreach_transcript.pdf (“[W]hile marketing campaigns will help 
educate individuals and raise awareness, enrollment efforts will really be driven 
at the local level through on-the-ground work. . . .”). 
 39. See id. at 18-19 (statement of Kathleen Westcoat, HealthCare Access 
Maryland, noting that the state has developed partnerships with grocery stores, 
has bought advertising time during popular sports events, and will send 
personnel to drug stores and other gathering places). 
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2. Market Reforms and Stronger Consumer   
  Protections 
    
The transparency and consumer information aspects of 
the ACA permit the ACA’s market reforms to function and be 
enforced. These reforms included the ACA’s prohibition on 
some of the most damaging insurance practices—the barring 
of individuals with pre-existing conditions40 and the 
elimination of lifetime caps on coverage.41 Rescission, the 
practice of cancelling insurance due to an application error 
after a person files a claim, is also prohibited.42  
The ACA also includes new appeal requirements for both 
internal and external review of claim denials, so that 
consumers can more effectively challenge an insurance 
company.43 Additional patient protections include a choice of 
primary care providers and required coverage of emergency 
services, pediatric, and obstetrical and gynecological care.44  
Consumer information is crucial for protection of 
consumers in financial regulation, particularly insurance,45 
so that consumers and those who wish to act on their behalf 
can advocate based on full information.46 To disseminate 
information, the ACA makes grants available to create state 
offices of health insurance consumer assistance and 
ombudsman programs.47 Even before the ACA, consumer 
  
 40. ACA § 2704. 
 41. Id. § 2711. 
 42. Id. § 2712. 
 43. Id. § 2719. 
 44. Id. § 2713(a). 
 45. See Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 394.  
 46. See id. (“Broadly construed, transparency involves making relevant 
information available to consumers as well as others who might act on their 
behalf, such as academics, journalists, newspapers, consumer organizations, or 
other market watchdogs.”). 
 47.  The ACA’s consumer assistance portion provides: 
Health Insurance Consumer Information  
(a) In General—The Secretary shall award grants to States to enable 
such States (or the Exchanges operating in such States) to establish, 
expand, or provide support for—  
(1) offices of health insurance consumer assistance; or  
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assistance programs run by the states performed a number 
of different consumer assistance functions, from education to 
advocacy in the claims process.48 To establish or expand these 
programs under the ACA, the states can apply for grants 
from the federal government; the offices and ombudsmen 
then disseminate information regarding available health 
insurance options, educate consumers regarding their rights, 
and assist consumers with the complex health claim appeal 
  
(2) health insurance ombudsman programs.  
(b) Eligibility 
(1) In general—To be eligible to receive a grant, a State shall designate 
an independent office of health insurance consumer assistance, or an 
ombudsman, that, directly or in coordination with State health insurance 
regulators and consumer assistance organizations, receives and 
responds to inquiries and complaints concerning health insurance 
coverage with respect to Federal health insurance requirements and 
under State law.  
(2) Criteria—A State that receives a grant under this section shall 
comply with criteria established by the Secretary for carrying out 
activities under such grant.  
(c) Duties—The office of health insurance consumer assistance or health 
insurance ombudsman shall—  
(1) assist with the filing of complaints and appeals, including filing 
appeals with the internal appeal or grievance process of the group health 
plan or health insurance issuer involved and providing information 
about the external appeal process;  
(2) collect, track, and quantify problems and inquiries encountered by 
consumers;  
(3) educate consumers on their rights and responsibilities with respect 
to group health plans and health insurance coverage;  
(4) assist consumers with enrollment in a group health plan or health 
insurance coverage by providing information, referral, and assistance; 
and  
(5) resolve problems with obtaining premium tax credits under section 
36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.  
ACA § 2793(a)–(c). 
 48. CARRIE TRACY ET AL., MAKING HEALTH REFORM WORK: STATE CONSUMER 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y 1-7 (2010), available at 
http://www.communityhealthadvocates.org/sites/communityhealthadvocates.org/
files/publications/2010/Making_Health_Reform_Work_State_Consumer_Assista
nce_Programs.pdf. A program in Connecticut, for example, advocated directly for 
consumers statewide, employing nine staff members and closing 2613 complaints 
in 2009. Id. at 18.  
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process.49 But in addition to disseminating information, 
consumer assistance programs are meant to serve a 
“sentinel” role.50 That is, the ombudsmen and offices also 
collect information on the type and number of problems that 
consumers are experiencing.51 Indeed, the grants are 
conditioned upon the collection of such information.52 This 
information would in turn be used to determine the need for 
enforcement actions at the state and federal levels. 
Consumer assistance programs can perform this sentinel role 
most effectively when they remain independent yet maintain 
avenues for providing feedback to enforcement agencies and 
policy makers.53 
  
 49. See id. at 3-7. 
 50. Id. at 7. A consumer assistance program can alert state officials to patterns 
of non-compliance. Id. As an example, in 2008, a Massachusetts citizens 
assistance program determined from the calls it received that some consumers 
were not being sent proper recertification documents; the program alerted state 
officials, who were able to resolve the problem and prevent consumers from losing 
their insurance. Id.; Rachel Grob et al, The Affordable Care Act’s Plan for 
Consumer Assistance With Insurance Moves States Forward But Remains a Work 
in Progress, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 347, 354 (2013) (noting that “[c]onsumer 
assistance was envisioned under health reform both as a form of patient 
protection unto itself—universal access to broadly defined assistance—and as a 
mechanism for promoting robust implementation of new and existing insurance 
regulations.”).  
 51.  Consumer assistance or ombudsman programs  
shall be required to collect and report data to the Secretary on the types 
of problems and inquiries encountered by consumers. The Secretary 
shall utilize such data to identify areas where more enforcement action 
is necessary and shall share such information with State insurance 
regulators, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of the Treasury for 
use in the enforcement activities of such agencies. 
ACA § 2793(d). 
 52. Id. 
 53. One study of consumer assistance groups recommended that to be effective, 
consumer assistance programs should be independent of—but have strong 
feedback to—regulatory agencies, should serve consumers with all types of 
coverage, should be based in the communities they serve and have cultural 
competence and multiple language capacity, should employ trained professional 
staff, should use online tools, and should have a sustainable funding source. 
Programs with these characteristics can work with agencies and officials to 
ensure that enforcement efforts are more effectively directed. TRACY ET AL., supra 
note 48, at 22-23. 
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The states’ department of insurance websites can also be 
helpful in advising consumers of their rights. Within a few 
clicks from its home page, for example, the California 
Department of Insurance website explains the market 
reforms that are already in effect and those that are soon to 
be implemented.54 
Informational transparency thus ensures that 
consumers have the information they need to learn their 
rights, while consumer assistance programs collect necessary 
data for tailored enforcement of consumer protections. 
3. Lower Costs and Better Quality in Healthcare    
  Through Information Collection and Dissemination 
The ACA aims not simply to lower the cost of health 
insurance but to lower the cost of healthcare itself. The ACA 
takes aim at both the high cost of American health care and 
opacity in health care quality. One means of addressing 
quality and outcomes is to require the gathering and 
dissemination of information that will shed light on these 
issues.55 The ACA makes pricing information more available 
through a provision proposed by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services.56 The ACA contains provisions that 
will allow consumers to compare providers’ quality, such as 
  
 54.  The Affordable Care Act, CAL. DEP’T OF INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/
01-consumers/110-health/10-basics/aca.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) 
(explaining reforms such as the prohibition on rescission, the guarantee of issue 
despite pre-existing conditions, and others). 
 55. ACA § 2717(a)(1) (requiring the development of “reporting requirements 
for use by a group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage, with respect to plan or coverage benefits 
and health care provider reimbursement structures that—(A) improve health 
outcomes through the implementation of activities such as quality reporting, 
effective case management, care coordination, chronic disease management, and 
medication and care compliance initiatives.”). 
 56. The requirement can be fulfilled by releasing pricing information after an 
inquiry. Fiscal Year 2015 Proposed Policy and Payment Changes for Inpatient 
Stays in Acute-Care Hospitals and Long-Term Care Hospitals, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/
MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-04-30.html. 
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the dissemination of Comparative Effectiveness Research.57 
This provision requires the collection and dissemination of 
information about outcomes, risks, and clinical effectiveness 
of various treatments and services.58 The information must 
be useful and consumer-friendly to enable better decision-
making.59 This newly-available information will be used to 
determine and assign quality ratings and to measure and 
assess quality improvements.60 Other measures include 
administrative simplification61 and cost-saving changes to 
Medicare.62   
Relationships and exchanges of gifts can influence 
decision-makers, so the ACA sheds light on these too. The 
Physician Payment Sunshine provision requires disclosure of 
gifts worth as little as $10 to physicians from pharmaceutical 
companies.63 Practitioners are already anticipating that this 
provision will result in greater scrutiny and increased 
enforcement actions.64 The ACA also contains reporting and 
  
 57. Some commentators believe this provision is an exception to the ACA’s 
overall top-down approach, which regulates at the supply side rather than 
allowing meaningful consumer participation. Marshall B. Kapp, Health Reform 
and the Affordable Care Act: Not Really Trusting the Consumer, 42 STET. L. REV. 
9, 11-18 (2012). 
 58. Consumers are the intended audience for this information—the 
information is to be disseminated in a fashion that is “comprehensible and 
useful . . . in making . . . decisions.” ACA § 6301(d)(8)(A)(i). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Ledia M. Tabor et al., Measuring Quality in the Early Years of Health 
Insurance Exchanges, 19 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 220 (2013). 
 61. As much as twenty-four percent of U.S. healthcare spending goes to 
paperwork and bureaucracy. MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 137. The ACA 
attempts to lower this number by requiring that HHS create new, uniform 
standards and operating rules, as well as health insurers’ compliance with the 
rules. Id. at 138. Financial penalties are to be levied for non-compliance. Id. 
 62. ACA Title III passim. Title III contains approximately $449 billion in 
savings, through rate reductions and system improvements. MCDONOUGH, supra 
note 9, at 156. 
 63. See ACA § 6002. 
 64. It seems likely that the increased transparency contemplated by the 
ACA will result in an increase in enforcement actions under existing fraud and 
abuse (kickback) laws, and attorneys representing the industry, as well as those 
advising physicians, teaching hospitals, and other providers, need to be far more 
attentive to such concerns than they may have been in the past. Paul DeStefano, 
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transparency provisions with regard to physician ownership 
of hospitals and nursing homes.65 The ACA requires collection 
of information on race, ethnicity, sex, primary language, and 
disability status to make this information available to 
researchers and to work toward reducing disparities.66  
The ACA also means transparency and movement of 
information at the physician/patient level, with the 
requirement that physicians switch to electronic records.67 In 
brief, movement of information occurs at multiple levels and 
across practically every relationship in healthcare, so that 
consumers have the information they need to judge price, 
quality, and even biased decision-making in their healthcare. 
4.  A New Focus on Prevention 
Title IV of the ACA puts in place a national strategy 
toward disease prevention and early detection. The ACA 
increases access to preventative services through Medicare 
by requiring Medicare coverage of wellness and preventive 
services,68 and also through private insurance by requiring 
coverage of preventative health services and 
immunizations.69 Transparency matters to these provisions 
  
Key Legal Issues and Challenges Facing the Life Sciences Industry, in 
UNDERSTANDING LEGAL TRENDS IN THE LIFE SCIENCES INDUSTRY 39 (THOMSON 
REUTERS/ASPATORE 2014).  
 65. See ACA § 6002. 
 66. Effective March 23, 2012, the ACA requires the collection and reporting of 
certain “data on race, ethnicity, sex, primary language, and disability 
status.” ACA § 4302. The data collection and disaggregation “will help address 
and reduce disparities faced by communities including lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) Americans.” The Second Anniversary of Health Care Reform 
is Good News, Will There be a Third?, CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY, 
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/the-second-anniversary-of-health-care-reform-
is-good-news-will-there-be-a-third (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). This information 
is to be made publicly available and is to be provided to various offices and 
institutions. Id. Within four years after the ACA’s enactment, the Secretary is to 
report to Congress and recommend improved means for identifying disparities. 
ACA § 1946(b)(2). 
 67. ACA § 1104. 
 68. ACA § 4103-05. 
 69. Id. § 2713. 
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too, with requirements such as the inclusion of calorie counts 
on restaurant menus.70  
Thus, the ACA is steeped in informational transparency 
provisions, particularly with regard to consumer access to 
information about benefits, rights, and health insurance 
company practices. The ACA’s basis in cooperative 
federalism, however, means that the states are free to reject 
some of the most significant informational transparency 
provisions—and many states have chosen to do exactly that. 
II. OBSTRUCTIVE FEDERALISM AND THE WAR ON 
 INFORMATIONAL TRANSPARENCY 
The ACA’s consumer information transparency 
provisions are vulnerable to state resistance and obstruction 
because the consumer information provisions are designed to 
include a significant role for state governments. As a whole, 
the ACA sets out a variety of different combinations of state 
and federal roles addressing health insurance coverage, 
consumer protections, cost of care, and other issues. Some 
provisions call for the federal government to act alone, others 
leave actions entirely to the states, and some invite state 
participation but retain a federal fallback if the states do not 
act. The latter, a combined federal/state approach known as 
“cooperative federalism,” allows the states to tailor programs 
according to their citizens’ particular needs and desires.71 In 
the ACA’s case, however, cooperative federalism also allows 
anti-ACA states to reject completely some portions of the 
ACA, particularly those that would be most helpful to 
consumers: those addressing communication with consumers 
on the matter of coverage availability and options, rate 
review, and consumer rights.  
  
 70. Section 4205 requires calorie labeling on chain restaurant menus, and 
section 4101 provides $50 million in grants for school-based clinics serving 
medically underserved families and children, for fiscal years 2010 through 2013. 
 71. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right 
to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1338 (2010) (discussing cooperative 
federalism and programs in which the state spent monies but also received 
monies from the federal government). For a further discussion, see Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983) 
(discussing approaches to cooperative federalism). 
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A. Cooperative Federalism 
The ACA’s basis in cooperative federalism arises out of 
constitutional concerns, practical considerations, and 
political necessity. Traditionally, the states dealt with 
insurance regulation, leaving the federal government with 
less experience in such matters.72 Other reasons make state 
participation an appealing option—state governments are 
closer to citizens’ concerns. Because the states are smaller 
units of government, citizens are more likely to be able to 
have their voices heard and recognized; the state government 
can therefore be more responsive to its citizens than the 
federal government can be.73 With regard to certain 
programs, the states are able to carry out the federal 
program’s goals effectively and connect more easily with 
citizens. With regard to health care, proponents of a greater 
state role have stressed local variation and the expertise of 
state health personnel on the ground.74 And, with regard to 
the states, numerous aspects of state constitutions provide 
  
 72. Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Fixing Obamacare: The Virtues of 
Choice, Competition, and Deregulation, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 493, 511 
(2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: 
State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE 
L.J. 534, 565-66 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism] (noting 
that “there are many other reasons that the federal government uses state 
implementers . . . the value of policy experimentation, state autonomy, the 
inability of uniform solutions to fit diverse localities, citizens’ greater ability to 
participate in the local political process, the comparative strengths of the states 
in certain areas of the law, and the fact that pockets of state control serve as 
important checks on national authority.”). The states’ role in insurance matters 
has been less sovereign in recent decades, however, with the federal government’s 
encroachment on the states’ authority through programs such as Medicaid, the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) and others that function 
through both state and federal participation. Kyle Thomson, State-Run Insurance 
Exchanges in Federal Healthcare Reform: A Case Study in Dysfunctional 
Federalism, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 548, 549 (2012) (citing PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982)). 
 73. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (noting 
that “the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally 
administered by smaller governments closer to the governed”). 
 74. Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism From Federal Statutes: Health Reform, 
Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 
1751-52 (2013).  
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the means to ensure that the states remain responsive to 
their citizens.75  
Politics also drove the ACA’s inclusion of state 
preferences. As a practical matter, the ACA was more 
palatable politically due to its status as a state/federal 
program rather than a purely federal one.76 The Republicans 
preferred from the outset a federally-financed but state-
administered approach, as opposed to a purely federal one.77 
Indeed, without this structure, the ACA may not have passed 
at all.78 With the ACA, the Republicans prevailed and 
received their preferred structure.79  
Cooperative federalism presents a delicate balance, 
however, because the federal government’s power to control 
the actions of state governments is limited. As the Supreme 
Court reiterated in NFIB v. Sebelius,80 the federal 
government cannot take control of state apparatuses to carry 
  
 75. James A. Gardner, Devolution and the Paradox of Democratic 
Unresponsiveness, 40 S. TEX. L. R. 759, 765-68 (1999) (describing features of state 
governments that make them more responsive to their citizens, such as 
opportunity to elect lower-level officials, provisions for popular recall, term limits, 
limits in taking on debt, and others). 
 76. See, e.g., MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 128. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 578 (“Giving the states 
the leadership role was the concession ultimately required to close the deal.”). In 
the end, the cooperative federalism model was the only one that could pass, due 
to the procedural posture of the bills after the loss of Democrats’ sixty-vote 
majority in the senate following the Massachusetts special election. MCDONOUGH, 
supra note 9, at 128. The House reform plan envisioned a single, federally-run 
exchange, but in the reconciliation process, the Senate version prevailed. Id. But, 
after Democrats lost their sixty-vote majority in the Senate following the 
Massachusetts special election to replace the deceased Senator Kennedy, health 
reform could only be passed via the reconciliation process, which required only 
fifty-one votes for passage. Id. at 94. Under reconciliation, the only changes that 
can be made are those that have a direct and substantial impact on the budget. 
Id. at 97. The Senate parliamentarian had ruled that no changes could be made 
to the Senate bill’s exchange structure, because those would not affect the budget. 
Id. at 128. Therefore, the Senate version of the exchanges—which invited state 
participation—stayed in the final bill. Id. 
 79. MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 128.  
 80. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012). 
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out its goals81—the federal government possesses only 
enumerated powers, not a “general authority to perform all 
the conceivable functions of government.”82 The 
constitutionality of any particular federal/state program 
turns on the issue of choice—that is, does the state have a 
“genuine choice” available to not follow the federal request?83  
Using this analysis, the ACA’s offering of grants with 
conditions attached did not violate the anti-commandeering 
principle,84 but the mandatory Medicaid expansion did.85 In 
the case of the Medicaid expansion, the Court ruled that 
there was no such “genuine choice,” because the ACA 
threatened to take away all of a recalcitrant state’s Medicaid 
payments, which generally represent 20% of a state’s total 
budget.86 In making this determination, the Court potentially 
  
 81. “Congress may not simply ‘conscript state [agencies] into the national 
bureaucratic army.’” Id. at 2606-07 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 82. Id. at 2577.  
 83. See id. at 2607-08. 
 84. Id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds 
under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and 
requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their 
use.”). 
 85. The Court illustrated its reasoning with the example of Congress’s tying of 
highway funds to the states’ minimum drinking age. When Congress threatened 
five percent of the states’ federal highway funds if they did not raise their 
minimum drinking age to twenty-one years of age, the provision was permissible 
because of the scale of the inducement: five percent of highway funds represented 
less than half a percent of South Dakota’s budget at the time South Dakota 
challenged the drinking age requirement. Id. at 2604. This, the Court explained, 
was a “relatively mild encouragement.” Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203, 211 (1987))  
 86. Id. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion explained the ACA could permissibly 
require the states to comply with the ACA’s conditions so as to qualify for the 
funding associated with the Medicaid expansion. Id. at 2607. The impermissible 
piece, however, was Congress’s requirement that the states either participate in 
the “new program” of Medicaid expansion or lose their Medicaid funds completely, 
including funds for Medicaid as it existed before the ACA. Id. The opinion 
describes the expanded Medicaid as distinct from Medicaid pre-ACA. See id. 
Threatening states with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding streams—
funds constituting, on average, more than twenty percent of a state’s annual 
budget—“is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the 
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altered the anti-commandeering doctrine, with significant 
implications for numerous programs.87 
The ACA contains a variety of different combinations of 
federal/state roles; some provisions are purely federal, 
effective without state participation, while others envision 
the states and the federal government working in tandem.88 
With regard to the exchanges, for example, state 
participation is invited, with a federal backup.89 The states 
are meant to set up and operate exchanges, which are entities 
that “facilitate[ ] the purchase” of health insurance.90 The 
ACA sets out a mechanism for states to put in place their own 
exchanges,91 but if a state does not set up an exchange, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services will establish and 
operate an exchange in that state.92 This combination of state 
and federal oversight represents a departure from the states’ 
traditional role as the exclusive authority over insurance, 
healthcare, and public health matters within their borders.93  
In other areas, the ACA sets a mandatory federal floor 
for the states, preempting state law and imposing strict 
penalties. The market reforms, for example, speak directly to 
insurance companies—a state opt-in is not required for 
  
head.” Id. at 2604. Because the Act offered the states no “genuine choice” or “real 
option” other than to implement the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, reasoned the 
Chief Justice, it “require[d] the States to govern according to Congress’ 
instructions,” violating the structural principles of federalism. Id. at 2602, 2605, 
2607.  
 87. See, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, The Health Care Cases and the New 
Meaning of Commandeering, 91 N.C. L. REV. 811, 832-36 (2013). 
 88. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 577 (“Some provisions 
in the statute, like those concerning the insurance exchanges, are expressly 
intended to be ‘state led’; others, like the Medicare provisions, are unquestionably 
federally focused; still others, such as the Medicaid provisions and the insurance 
regulation provisions, lie somewhere in between, with a role clearly foreseen for 
state and federal regulators acting concurrently.”). 
 89. ACA § 1311(b)(1)(A). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. § 1321(c). To operate its exchanges in non-state-exchange states, HHS 
contracts with not-for-profit entities. Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 155 (2014).  
 93. Thomson, supra note 72, at 549 (citing STARR, supra note 72)). 
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implementation.94 While the states can enact laws that are 
more consumer-friendly than those in the ACA, provisions 
such as the prohibition on barring consumers with pre-
existing conditions apply, regardless of a particular state’s 
desires.95 With regard to providing a summary of benefits and 
coverage, for example, the ACA sets a compliance standard, 
preempts all state laws that require less disclosure than the 
federal standard, and imposes a strict penalty of $1000 per 
day, per violation, per insured person.96  
Cooperative federalism’s dual state and federal 
implementation is not without its pitfalls—the federal 
government’s delegation of authority to the states poses a 
risk of “uncooperative administration.”97 While the ACA is 
not the first program to call for state and federal cooperation, 
it was passed in a highly partisan atmosphere in which ACA 
opposition has become almost a badge of honor among certain 
groups.98 The ACA passed without a single Republican vote,99 
  
 94. E.g., ACA §§ 2704-06.  
 95. See id. § 2701(a)(1) (stating that insurers may not discriminate on the basis 
of gender and describing other bases for price differences). 
 96. Id. § 2715. 
 97. Some have predicted that as designed, the ACA’s approach to cooperative 
federalism is destined to fail, due to possible continued constitutional challenges 
and political debate, particularly with regard to the exchanges. See Thomson, 
supra note 72, at 550. Thomson argues that because very little variation in the 
state exchanges is contemplated, the exchange program does not harness the 
potential benefits of cooperative federalism, and the exchanges would be better 
suited to be an exclusively federal construct. Id.; see also Gluck, Intrastatutory 
Federalism, supra note 72, at 605 (noting that “[t]he ability of states to opt out of 
administering federal programs or to administer them disloyally illustrates one 
kind of ‘autonomy’ that states still retain, and is something that significantly 
distinguishes them from federal agencies.”). 
 98. EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, REINVENTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 280 (2014) 
(describing the partisan atmosphere as one in which “conservatives—politicians 
and the conservative media—were literally rooting for the ACA to crash and took 
every glitch as an opportunity to declare it a total failure.”). 
 99. On December 24, 2009, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
passed the Senate with sixty votes in favor and thirty-nine opposed; the positive 
votes were all from Democrats. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress-1st 
Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_
call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00396 (last visited Mar. 17, 
2015). The House voted on March 21, 2010, with 220 in favor and 211 against, 
with the votes in favor still coming only from Democrats. Final Vote Results for 
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and it remains a highly controversial law, dividing public 
opinion. According to national polls, at the end of April 2014, 
after the first open enrollment period closed, 46% of people 
had a negative opinion of the ACA, while 38% of people had 
a positive opinion of the law.100 Public sentiment against the 
ACA was and remains particularly strong in southern, 
Republican-led states.101    
  
Roll Call 167, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov
/evs/2010/roll167.xml (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). In the reconciliation process, 
the Senate voted fifty-six in favor and forty-three against to approve the bill and 
its amendments on March 25, 2010. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress-
2nd Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/
roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=2&vote=00105 (last visited Mar. 
17, 2015). 
 100. Public Opinion on the ACA at the End of the First Open Enrollment Period, 
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/slideshow/public-opinion-on-
the-aca-at-the-end-of-the-first-open-enrollment-period (last visited Mar. 17, 
2015). 
 101. In a New York Times/Kaiser poll of individuals in Arkansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, and North Carolina, the majority of individuals disapproved of the 
ACA. In Arkansas, 62% disapproved; in Kentucky, 55% disapproved; in 
Louisiana, 59% disapproved, and in North Carolina, 54% disapproved. Sabrina 
Tavernise & Allison Kopicki, Southerners Don’t Like Obamacare. They Also Don’t 
Want to Repeal It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
04/24/health/health-law-repeal-has-little-support-poll-finds.html?_r=0. In Texas, 
54% disapproved and 33% approved. Texans on the Affordable Care Act, TEX. 
POLITICS PROJECT (Oct. 2013), http://texaspolitics.utexas.edu/archive/
html/poll/features/201310_ACA/slide1.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). Opinion 
on the ACA is divided along party lines. For example, 11% of Texas Democrats 
oppose the law and 73% favor it, while 85% of Texas Republicans opposing the 
law and 4% favor it. Texans on the Affordable Care Act, TEX. POLITICS PROJECT 
(Oct. 2013), http://texaspolitics.utexas.edu/archive/html/poll/features/201310_
ACA/slide2.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015); see also Lizette Alvarez & Robert 
Pear, Florida Among States Undercutting Health Care Enrollment, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/us/florida-among-states-
undercutting-health-care-enrollment.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on the 
opposition from Florida, Missouri, and Ohio Republicans). Nationally, opinion 
polls show a partisan divide in opinions on the ACA, with 68% of Democrats 
approving of the ACA and 17% disapproving in April 2014, while 76% of 
Republicans disapproved and 11% approved. Health Tracking Poll Exploring the 
Public’s Views on the Affordable Care Act, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
http://kff.org/interactive/health-tracking-poll-exploring-the-publics-views-on-the-
affordable-care-act-aca (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (follow “PARTY ID” link; then 
follow “Democrat” or “Republican” link); see also KYLE A. DROPP ET AL., CTR. FOR 
EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT., THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: AN EXPERIMENT IN 
FEDERALISM? 2 (2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/
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Acceptance or rejection of the ACA tends to follow party 
lines—the twelve states with governors and both chambers 
of their legislatures controlled by Democrats have all opted 
to operate their own exchanges.102 Of the twenty-seven states 
giving control of exchanges to the federal government, 
twenty-four have Republican governors; twenty-two of the 
twenty-seven have Republican-majority state Senates.103 
Republican leaders are under intense pressure to reject the 
ACA.104 Some posit that those states that have declined to 
implement the exchanges have leaders who actively want the 
ACA to fail.105 In that regard, the ACA faces challenges to 
implementation that other programs based on cooperative 
federalism have not.106 Perhaps predictably, in the 
implementation of certain ACA provisions involving 
informational transparency for consumers, the intended 
cooperative federalism has splintered into obstructive 
federalism that undermines the ACA’s goals with regard to 
consumers.   
B. Obstructive Federalism and the ACA’s Transparency 
Provisions 
While the Medicaid non-expansion is the best known 
area of anti-ACA states’ resistance, certain states’ rejection 
of the ACA’s outreach and informational transparency 




2213.pdf (noting the “partisan opposition to health care reform at the state level”).  
 102. DROPP ET AL., supra note 101, at 1, 4-6. 
 103. Id. at 6. 
 104. See Sara Rosenbaum, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Federalism and the 
Future of U.S. Health Policy Under the Affordable Care Act, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 167, 170-71 (2014) (describing the polemics against any move towards 
cooperative federalism). 
 105. DROPP ET AL., supra note 101, at 6. 
 106. NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., REFLECTIONS ON IMPLEMENTING MEDICARE (M.G. 
Gluck & V. Reno eds., 2001), available at http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/
med_report_reflections.pdf; Jonathan Oberlander, Obamacare Faces Hurdles 
that Medicare Did Not, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2013/05/29/is-obamacare-too-complicated-to-succeed/obamacare-
faces-hurdles-that-medicare-did-not. 
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Medicaid expansion and other provisions is softening in 
many states due to pragmatic concerns, the anti-information 
stance shows little sign of retreat.  
1. Obstructive Federalism and the Softening    
  Opposition to Medicaid’s Expansion   
  
The anti-ACA states’ refusal to expand Medicaid is their 
most heavily criticized act of opposition. But the same states 
that loudly reject the expansion are at the same time working 
quietly to find pragmatic solutions that may eventually 
expand Medicaid almost as the ACA’s drafters originally 
designed.  
The ACA was drafted with the Medicaid expansion 
fulfilling an important place in the patchwork of health 
insurance coverage opportunities that would, together, bring 
a new thirty-two million people under the health insurance 
umbrella.107 Medicaid previously insured mainly individuals 
in defined categories, such as children, parents with 
dependent children, the disabled, and the elderly.108 The 
expansion would have made individuals eligible for Medicaid 
provided they earn no more than 138% of the poverty line.109 
Those with higher incomes are eligible for federal tax 
subsidies of their premiums through federal law and with no 
state participation necessary.110 With the mandatory 
Medicaid expansion deemed unconstitutional under Sebelius, 
twenty-four states (as of March 2014) have decided not to 
expand Medicaid in their states.111  
Despite the strident political opposition to expanding 
Medicaid, there are signs of softening opposition in some 
states. Even the state of Texas, whose governor once 
  
 107. See Hall, supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 108. The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand 
Medicaid, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://kff.org/report-section/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-
that-do-not-expand-medicaid. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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compared the Medicaid expansion to the Titanic,112 seems to 
show some signs that pragmatic fiscal concerns might 
eventually result in a negotiated settlement over the 
expansion of Medicaid.113 A more pragmatic approach is 
palatable to many constituencies, such as charitable groups114 
and healthcare providers.115 When individuals do not have 
health insurance, they pay “only about 35-38% of the total 
medical costs they incur.”116 The remainder of the cost is paid 
by charitable organizations, the insured, and the 
government, while the providers themselves end up paying 
the balance.117 Hospitals are bearing the brunt of the failure 
to expand Medicaid, as they continue to see low-income 
patients; but the low-income patients lack health insurance 
coverage or Medicaid to pay their bills.118 Hospitals are 
therefore likely to become advocates for the expansion of 
  
 112. Kathryn Smith, Rick Perry: Medicaid Is Like Adding People to Titanic, 
POLITICO (July 9, 2012, 12:22 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/
78239.html. 
 113. Texas officials continue to push for a federal block grant to expand 
Medicaid as the state sees fit—to date, this proposal has not been accepted. See, 
e.g., Becca Aaronson, Zerwas Proposes Alternative to Medicaid Expansion, TEX. 
TRIBUNE (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/04/16/zerwas-
proposes-alternative-medicaid-expansion.  
 114. See generally STACEY CHAZIN & VERONICA GUERRA, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE 
STRATEGIES, INC., IMPACT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON CHARITY CARE 
PROGRAMS (2013), available at http://www.chcs.org/media/Charity_Care_
Brief__090413_FINAL.pdf. 
 115. Pressure continues to build on the governor, however, given the anticipated 
reductions in funding for hospitals that treat the uninsured. See Becca Aaronson, 
Without Medicaid Expansion, Hospitals Seek Long-Term Solution, TEX. TRIBUNE 
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/02/14/without-medicaid-
expansion-hospitals-seek-long-ter. 
 116. Edward A. Morse, Lifting the Fog: Navigating Penalties in the Affordable 
Care Act, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 207, 216 (2013) (citing Brief Amici Curiae of 
Economic Scholars in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 13, Liberty Univ., Inc. 
v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2347)). 
 117. See Brief Amici Curiae of Economic Scholars in Support of Defendant-
Appellees, supra note 116, at 13-14. 
 118. See Jonathan Oberlander, The Future of Obamacare, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2165-67 (2012); State’s Inaction on Coverage for the Working Poor Has 
Consequences for Uninsured, Taxpayers, Hospitals, TEX. HOSP. ASS’N., 
https://www.tha.org/HealthCareProviders/Issues/HealthCareCoverage/StatesIn
actiononCoF0933/index.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
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Medicaid.119 Given these considerations, some opposition 
states have found more palatable a plan that supplements 
private health insurance but does not directly expand the 
Medicaid program.120 Because the states stand to gain 
considerable federal funds from the Medicaid expansion, 
expanding Medicaid in some fashion would make sense.121  
Some predict that after the 2016 election, states that now 
reject the Medicaid expansion will opt to expand Medicaid, in 
two waves.122 The last wave will include states such as Texas, 
which may take until after the 2020 election to expand, just 
as the last state to implement Medicaid did so seventeen 
years after the program’s enactment.123 Thus, even as 
governors and legislators in anti-ACA states declare their 
opposition to the Medicaid expansion, their stance is shifting. 
In addition, state health officials are moving forward with 
other reforms on the ground.124 The rejection of Medicaid’s 
expansion is thus yielding to political and financial costs that 
do not apply as directly to the consumer information 
transparency provisions.  
2. Obstructive Federalism’s Hostility to Consumer   
  Information Transparency 
 
Some anti-ACA states remain steadfastly against many 
of the informational transparency provisions that invite state 
participation and that would help consumers obtain their 
  
 119. See Oberlander, The Future of Obamacare, supra note 118, at 2166. 
 120. Indiana Governor Mike Pence, for example, urged repeal of the ACA yet 
offered a solution to the non-expansion of Medicaid in his state. Ken Thomas, 
Pence Promotes Alternative Healthcare Proposal, AP NEWS (May 19, 2014), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/pence-promotes-health-care-proposal-dc. His plan 
would enlarge an existing Indiana program, which provides health savings 
accounts to those with incomes of up to 138% of the poverty line. Id. The governor 
believes that this program allows people to make their own choices with regard 
to health insurance. Id. 
 121. EMANUEL, supra note 98, at 295. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 295-97. 
 124. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 591 (noting that “at the 
same time that governors (and state attorneys general) in a number of states that 
are publicly opposing the new reforms, their state bureaucracies are moving 
ahead (with the governors’ approval) to implement them.”). 
2015] OBAMACARE INTERRUPTED 449 
ACA benefits and rights. While certain informational 
transparency provisions take effect without regard to the 
states’ actions or opinions, others call for state participation. 
Significantly, the provisions that concern communication 
with consumers on the ground regarding their options and 
their rights are also those that give states the greatest 
flexibility in their implementation.  
Unlike the non-expansion of Medicaid, the undermining 
of informational transparency operates quietly, with little 
controversy. While the non-expansion of Medicaid has 
awoken a groundswell of stakeholder opposition, the 
undermining of informational transparency provisions has 
provoked little push to reverse course.   
a. Refusing State Exchanges. States that decline to 
implement their own exchanges are declining not just a 
purchasing place for consumers, but the opportunity to 
promote health insurance to the uninsured, to increase 
enrollment, and to connect citizens to other programs.  
The ACA allows states to set up their own health 
insurance exchanges but provides a federal exchange for 
states that do not implement their own.125 The ACA permits 
and encourages variety in state implementation of the 
exchanges.126 Twenty-seven states have declined to set up 
exchanges to sell and promote health insurance purchases.127 
Citizens of these states can still shop for federally-subsidized 
health insurance and compare plan costs and other features 
by using the federal exchanges.128 Given this federal fallback, 
  
 125. See ACA § 1321(c). 
 126. The ACA mentions “state flexibility” numerous times, see id. §§ 1321, 1331, 
1412, and also has a waiver provision allowing states to apply for permission to 
use their own programs to accomplish the ACA’s goal. See id. § 1332. 
 127. State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2015, THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insurance-
exchanges (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 128. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES & THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES 31 (2010), available at 
http://www.thalassemia.org/updates/pdf/HealthInsuranceExchanges.pdf (noting 
that the ACA “establishes federal fallback authority to create a federal exchange 
as well as a multistate insurance program.”). 
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does state non-participation matter?129 The early signs 
suggest that it does.  
Citizens of non-exchange states can still shop for the 
ACA’s federally-subsidized insurance, but insurance 
availability is not the state exchanges’ only intended 
function—state exchanges serve a connective and 
informational function too. The ACA requires that when 
states set up their own exchanges, the exchange must have 
“streamline[d] and simplif[ied] application processes” for the 
state’s state and federal healthcare programs.130 Thus, when 
fully integrated with a state’s other public programs, a state 
exchange can funnel participants to an array of other 
programs.131 At its most ambitious and integrated, a state 
exchange can disseminate information through vertical and 
horizontal integration of federal and state benefits.132 An 
exchange can thereby increase uptake in a variety of 
programs by serving as a full service access point.133 Through 
approaches such as these, the exchanges can limit the 
“bureaucratic disentitlement” that limits participation in 
  
 129. See Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 565. 
 130. EAST BAY CMTY. LAW CTR., THE OBAMACARE OPPORTUNITY: IMPLEMENTING 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT TO IMPROVE HEALTH, REDUCE HARDSHIP, AND GROW THE 
ECONOMY FOR ALL CALIFORNIANS 10 (2013) [hereinafter EAST BAY, OBAMACARE 
OPPORTUNITY], available at https://ebclc.org/documents/Obamacare_Opportunity.
2013.08.pdf. 
 131. JOST, supra note 128, at 30 (“The exchanges play important roles as 
advocates of insurance affordability, as administrators of cost-sharing reduction 
subsidies, and as gateways to other public programs.”). 
 132. EAST BAY, OBAMACARE OPPORTUNITY, supra note 130. 
 133. See id. at 4. One non-exchange state—Pennsylvania—provides an example 
of such access. Pennsylvania provides access to thirteen benefit programs using a 
single application. Id. at 15 n.81 (noting that “COMPASS integrates the 
applications of the following programs: Medicaid, Medicare, CHIP, case 
assistance (TANF, diversion program, state blind program, refugee cash 
assistance program), LIHEAP, SNAP, home and community-based services, long 
term care, and school meals”). ACA exchanges could act as a similar one-stop 
place to enroll in numerous programs. 
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benefits.134 The state exchanges thus present an opportunity 
to improve access to benefits for individuals and families.135  
Early statistics show some indications that generally, 
states with their own exchanges have achieved greater 
enrollment of uninsured individuals than have states that 
rely on the federal exchanges.136 Enrollment is higher in those 
states with their own exchanges, and those states spent 
larger amounts of money on promotion of health insurance to 
potential insureds.137 The states with federally-facilitated 
exchanges did, however, enjoy a surge in enrollment toward 
the end of the enrollment period.138 Despite the surge, 
enrollment of uninsured individuals still lags in states 
without exchanges.139 The reasons for this lag are difficult to 
  
 134. Id. at 9.  
The negative effect of quality control reports is an example of 
“bureaucratic disentitlement”: largely obscure bureaucratic actions and 
inactions that effectively reduce welfare benefits by making participation 
in the program more difficult. The sources of such reductions, political in 
nature, are often difficult to pinpoint. They usually appear as 
administrative decisions, such as budgetary allocations or cut backs, but 
directly affect the receipt of benefits. Bureaucratic disentitlement thus 
keeps welfare agencies from meeting their constituents’ needs.  
Maria Fazzolari, The Brown v. Guiliani Injunction: Combating Bureaucratic 
Disentitlement, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 421-22 (1996).  
 135. EAST BAY, OBAMACARE OPPORTUNITY, supra note 130, at 10. 
 136. DANIEL E. POLSKY ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., DECIPHERING THE 
DATA: FINAL ENROLLMENT RATES SHOW FEDERALLY RUN MARKETPLACES MAKE UP 
LOST GROUND AT END OF OPEN ENROLLMENT 2-3 (2014) [hereinafter POLSKY ET AL., 
FINAL ENROLLMENT], available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/
issue_briefs/2014/rwjf411792; DANIEL E. POLSKY ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND., DECIPHERING THE DATA: STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES SPENT HEAVILY TO 
HELP ENROLL CONSUMERS 3 (2014) [hereinafter POLSKY ET AL., STATE-BASED 
MARKETPLACES], available at http://ldihealtheconomist.com/media/state-based_
marketplaces_spent_heavily_to_enroll_consumers.pdf (“Enrollment data to date 
suggests wide variations in how successful states were in enrolling their eligible 
populations in private plans with [state-based exchange states], in general, 
having more success than [state with federally-facilitated marketplaces].”). 
 137. POLSKY ET AL., FINAL ENROLLMENT, supra note 136, at 2-3. 
 138. Id. at 1, 5 (noting that while enrollment in states with state-run exchanges 
still outpaced those with federal exchanges, “the federally facilitated 
marketplaces and some of the troubled state-based ones made up some ground in 
the last four to six weeks of the open enrollment period.”).  
 139. Id. at 2. 
452 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
pinpoint and are likely multiple. One possible reason, 
however, is that citizens are more willing to look to state 
resources for help with insurance.140  
Another is the federally-facilitated exchange states’ lack 
of support for outreach, as discussed below. Many argue that 
the key to a successful exchange is marketing and 
promotion.141 In states relying exclusively on the federal 
exchange, there is often a lack of the most basic information 
about the availability of health insurance on the federal 
exchange.142 And, as described below, these states also tend 
to be the same ones that have rejected navigators, consumer 
assistance centers, and other forms of information 
dissemination set out in the ACA.  
Thus, by abdicating responsibility for the exchanges to 
the federal government, the states are missing an 





 140. Id. at 5 (speculating that the states’ traditional role in insurance may have 
contributed to their faster start in enrollment). 
 141. “One of the key takeaways regarding enrollment is that advertising and 
strong political support are critical to successful enrollment.” Zarak Khan, 
Behavioral Economics and the Affordable Care Act: What States Should Know As 
They Design Health Insurance Exchanges 6 (Apr. 17, 2013) (unpublished 
Master’s thesis, Sanford School of Public Policy) (on file with the Duke University 
Library system); see POLSKY ET AL., FINAL ENROLLMENT, supra note 136, at 5 
(noting that “structural decisions may ultimately not be as important in 
enrollment success as more process-oriented ones, such as marketing and 
outreach to eligible populations, and consumer assistance in navigating the new 
marketplaces.”).  
 142. In Oklahoma, for example, citizens who turn to their state insurance 
department’s website for help with health insurance find no information about 
the federal exchange. See Warren Vieth, State Makes Little Effort to Promote 
Health Exchange, OKLAHOMA WATCH (Aug. 17, 2013), http://oklahomawatch.org/
2013/08/17/state-offers-little-help-with-navigating-health-exchange (noting that, 
six weeks before the ACA’s 2013-14 open enrollment was to begin, the state 
department of health website had no information about the possibility of signing 
up for health insurance on the federal exchange and the department of insurance 
discussed the state’s opposition to the ACA without any information on signing 
up for health insurance). 
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b. Silencing Enrollment Outreach. Lack of information 
remains a major barrier to enrollment in public health care 
programs.143 The purchase of health insurance is a complex 
one, requiring knowledge of where and how to purchase 
insurance, the features of various plans, and the available 
subsidies—outreach and marketing is therefore crucial. 
Nevertheless, some states impose restrictions on navigators 
and burden or reject other avenues of communication about 
the ACA. Former Health and Human Services Secretary 
Kathleen Sebelius asserted that Republicans are purposely 
keeping information from would-be ACA enrollees.144 
Purposeful or not, the result of these burdens and 
information gaps is a form of soft bureaucratic 
disentitlement,145 by which individuals are unable to claim 
the benefits to which they are entitled, due to bureaucratic 
actions or inactions. Specific actions against informational 
transparency for enrollees include the burdening of 
navigators and the refusal of funds for consumer assistance 
centers.  
i. Burdening Navigators. As explained above, the ACA 
recognizes potential enrolleees’ need for information and 
provides that insurance navigators will assist in explaining 
the law and helping individuals enroll in new insurance. 
Where a state does not develop its own exchange, the federal 
exchange acts as a fallback, together with its own navigator 
  
 143. EAST BAY, OBAMACARE OPPORTUNITY, supra note 130, at 8 (“Some people 
who are eligible do not apply for benefits because they do not know about the 
program or do not realize they qualify for it.”); Jennifer Stuber & Elizabeth 
Bradley, Barriers to Medicaid Enrollment: Who Is at Risk?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
292 (2005) (noting that about twenty percent of poor children are not enrolled in 
Medicaid and analyzing risk factors for failed uptake, such as health status, race, 
level of education, lack of access to transportation, and complexity of enrollment 
procedures). 
 144. According to Sebelius, “[t]he single largest challenge is to get information 
to individuals who may be eligible for benefits but really don’t know anything 
about the market.’’ Daniel Chang, Sebelius Spreads the Word on Healthcare 
Reform in Miami-Dade, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.miamiherald. 
com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1955172.html (noting that 
Sebelius thought Florida Republicans had been “keeping information from 
people” and stating that the greatest challenge was getting information to those 
people who might want to enroll).  
 145. See Fazzolari, supra note 134, at 421-22.  
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program. HHS issued regulations for navigators’ training 
and conduct.146 The fact that the navigators are federally 
certified and monitored has not dissuaded some states from 
imposing additional requirements. Many of the states 
without their own exchanges have also enacted navigator-
burdening legislation, further compounding the lack of 
outreach associated with the absence of a state exchange.147 
While a clear causal relationship between burdened 
navigators and low ACA enrollment is difficult to confirm, 
some analysis suggests a link between the burdens and lower 
enrollment.148 
Restrictions have included additional education and 
licensing requirements, and even restrictions on the content 
of information navigators can provide. Missouri, for example, 
passed its Health Insurance Marketplace Innovation Act of 
  
 146. 45 C.F.R. 155 (2014). The federal regulation requires  
a certified application counselor program. It creates conflict-of-interest, 
training and certification, and meaningful access standards; clarifies 
that any licensing, certification, or other standards prescribed by a state 
or Exchange must not prevent application of the provisions of title I of 
the Affordable Care Act; adds entities with relationships to issuers of 
stop loss insurance to the list of entities that are ineligible to become 
Navigators; and clarifies that the same ineligibility criteria that apply to 
Navigators apply to certain non-Navigator assistance personnel. The 
final rule also directs that each Exchange designate organizations which 
will then certify their staff members and volunteers to be application 
counselors that assist consumers and facilitate enrollment in qualified 
health plans and insurance affordability programs, and provides 
standards for that designation. 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange Functions: Standards for 
Navigators and Non-Navigator Assistance Personnel; Consumer Assistance Tools 
and Programs of an Exchange and Certified Application Counselors, 78 Fed. Reg. 
42,824, 42,824 (July 17, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 155).  
 147. See Justin Giovannelli et al., Under Pressure: An Update on Restrictive 
State Insurance Marketplace Consumer Assistance Laws, THE COMMONWEALTH 
FUND (Oct. 31, 2013), www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2013/
oct/under-pressure (“For Americans living in states with federally run 
marketplaces—where consumer outreach efforts have been modest to begin 
with—this chilling effect only makes it harder to learn about the health law and 
enroll in coverage.”). 
 148. See POLSKY ET AL., STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES, supra note 136, at 3 (“The 
effectiveness of the Navigators themselves might have differed from state to state, 
especially in states that create barriers to assister programs.”). 
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2013, which classified all federal navigators as state 
navigators149 and imposed stringent state requirements on all 
navigators. On January 23, 2014, a federal judge in the 
Western District of Missouri issued a preliminary injunction 
for these additional requirements, finding them unduly 
burdensome on the federal law.150 Under the Missouri law, 
navigators would have had to obtain a state license (in 
addition to the required federal license) and comply with 
continuing education requirements;151 navigators would also 
have had to become “insurance producers” under state law, 
which are insurance agents or insurance companies.152 In 
striking down the Missouri law, the court pointed out that 
the Missouri law precluded navigators from performing some 
functions that federal law required them to perform.153 
The State of Texas also enacted navigator requirements, 
complaining in the preamble to its new regulations that the 
federal regulations were not sufficiently stringent.154 The 
Texas requirements were enacted on January 21, 2014, and 
required compliance by March 1, 2014—with the 2014 open 
enrollment window set to close on March 31, 2014, the timing 
  
 149. In Missouri, a State Navigator is defined as a person who “for 
compensation, provides information or services in connection with eligibility, 
enrollment, or program specifications of any health benefit exchange operating in 
this state . . . .” MO. REV. STAT. § 376.2000(4) (2014). 
 150. See St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 996 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Mo. 2014). 
 151. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 376.2002(1), 2004(5), 2006(3) (2014). 
 152. Id. §§ 375.012(6), 014 (2014). 
 153. St. Louis Effort for AIDS, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (noting that federal 
navigators are required to “distribute fair and impartial information concerning 
enrollment” in health plans as well as information regarding tax credits, while 
the state law prohibited navigators from giving “advice concerning the benefits, 
terms and features of a particular health plan or offer advice about which 
exchange health plan is better or worse” without licensing as an insurance agent). 
The court found that the state law obstructed the federal purpose, because the 
ACA requires HHS to contract only with non-profit entities and those who are not 
receiving money from insurance companies—requiring that navigators be 
insurance agents yet not be receiving monies from insurance companies was 
therefore a “significant roadblock” to the ACA’s implantation and function. Id. at 
807. 
 154. TEX. DEP’T OF INS., COMMISSIONER’S ORDER NO. 2962 (2014), available at 
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/rules/2013/documents/navadoptionorder.pdf; see 28 TEX. 
ADMIN. CODE §§ 19.4001-4017 (2014). 
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left little leeway for navigators to comply and assist 
consumers during that open enrollment period. The law 
includes a twenty-hour training requirement, a background 
check, and proof that the navigator has liability insurance.155 
Four states—Georgia, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee—
prohibit navigators from advising potential enrollees on the 
benefits and details of particular plans, even though the 
federal rules call for navigators to help consumers make 
informed decisions about healthcare and decide which plan 
is best for the potential enrollee.156 
The effect of these burdens has been hard to quantify, but 
some analysis points to the navigator burdens as a reason for 
lower ACA enrollment in such states.157 
ii. Declining to Seek Consumer Assistance Center 
Funding and Restricting Advice. Many states are refusing to 
apply for the ACA’s grants for consumer assistance centers 
that are meant to help potential enrollees understand their 
options and rights; some states even prohibit non-ACA 
advisors from helping consumers select a suitable health 
plan.  
The need for information is significant—of those 
Americans without health insurance, only one in four 
understands the meaning of terms such as “deductible,” “out-
of-pocket spending cap,” or “co-pay.”158 Those without a 
college education—the demographic less likely to have 
insurance159—were even less likely to answer the questions 
  
 155. See COMMISSIONER’S ORDER NO. 2962, supra note 154. 
 156. Giovannelli et al., supra note 147, at 2. 
 157. See POLSKY ET AL., STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES, supra note 136, at 3 (“The 
effectiveness of the Navigators themselves might have differed from state to state, 
especially in states that create barriers to assister programs.”). 
 158. See George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misundertanding of Health 
Insurance, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 850, 858 (2013) (finding that only fourteen percent 
of survey participants could correctly answer all four questions addressing the 
basics of health insurance: deductibles, copays, coinsurance, and maximum out of 
pocket costs).  
 159. See id. at 857. 
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correctly.160 To address this health insurance literacy gap, the 
ACA provides funding for consumer assistance centers.161 
Twelve states and the District of Columbia currently 
have these programs; the rest do not.162 A Kaiser Family 
Foundation report notes, however, that even in the states 
that have adopted them, the programs have not been 
sufficiently funded.163 Although a second round of funding 
was announced in 2014, this funding was limited, available 
only to states that had obtained funding in the first round.164 
  
 160. See id.  
 161. ACA § 2793(e). 
 162. Consumer Assistance Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Consumer-Assistance-Grants (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2015). 
 163. KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAL DEBT 
AMONG PEOPLE WITH HEALTH INSURANCE 1, 21 (2014), available at 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/8537-medical-debt-
among-people-with-health-insurance.pdf (noting that “the law authorizes ‘such 
sums as are necessary’ to support CAPs but only appropriated $30 million.”). No 
funding has been announced since 2012, even though the CAPs  
are the only entities required, by federal law, to help privately insured 
people resolve health plan complaints and claims disputes and file 
appeals. Absent this help, as case studies illustrate, some people may 
continue to be overwhelmed by insurance paperwork they cannot 
understand and even incur debt for bills insurance should have paid.  
Id. at 21. 
 164. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LIMITED COMPETITION FOR AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT CONSUMER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM GRANTS 10 (2014), available at 
https://www.grantsolutions.gov/gs/preaward/previewPublicAnnouncement.do?id
=49797 (follow “View PDF” link).  
These grant funds can be used to re-establish, extend, or enhance 
activities being funded under the 2010 grants. For example, if a 
Consumer Assistance Program was performing an outreach campaign 
that included a 6-month public service announcement (PSA) on the radio 
under the 2010 grant award, that Consumer Assistance Program could 
extend the PSA beyond the original six months, or add a different PSA. 
The Consumer Assistance Program could also use these funds to add to 
the radio campaign through other media not currently included in their 
project plans, such as newspapers, local magazines, or television. Funds 
awarded under this grant funding opportunity announcement cannot 
supplant funding under any prior or future Consumer Assistance 
Program funding opportunities if grant periods overlap.  
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CONSUMER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
LIMITED COMPETITION FUNDING OPPORTUNITY ANNOUNCEMENT FAQS (2014), 
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Of the states that have not sought such help, many do not 
have their own exchanges, which further exacerbates the 
lack of information in those states. That is, states without 
their own exchanges already lack the outreach that goes 
along with exchanges,165 and those same states spend less 
money on consumer assistance.166 And, the states using the 
federal exchange have a far higher proportion of uninsured 
individuals to begin with than in those states with state 
exchanges.167  
In the states that have implemented citizens’ assistance 
programs, the results have been promising, and citizens have 
been helped. The states that have sought and accepted funds 
have spent them on programs such as consumer education, 
advocacy, and assistance.168 With additional millions of 
dollars, states are able to implement programs providing 
direct, local assistance to consumers, to inform them of their 




 165. See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 166. See POLSKY ET AL., STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES, supra note 136, at 3 (“By 
comparing consumer assistance funds to the uninsured, we found consumer 
assistance funds to be more concentrated in [state-based marketplace] states. 
[State based marketplace] accounted for 50% of total consumer assistance funds, 
although they have just 31% of all uninsured. In contrast, 63% of the uninsured 
live in [federally-facilitated marketplace] states, which accounted for 33% of the 
funding. The five partnership states in charge of consumer assistance functions 
were home to just 6% of the uninsured, but garnered 17% of the funding”). 
 167. See id. 
 168. Consumer Assistance Program, N.Y. STATE OF HEALTH (July 22, 2010), 
http://info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/resource/consumer-assistance-program; see 
also Consumer Assistance Program Grants: How States Are Using New Resource 
to Give Consumers Greater Control of Their Health Care, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://cms.gov/CCIIO/resources/grants/cap-grants-states.html 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (noting that New York used the money to enhance the 
capacity of partnering community based organizations to strengthen their 
geographical reach, provide more services, increase helpline capacity deepen 
presentation skills to educate consumers, educate staff about consumer appeals 
and how to assist with appeals, and strengthen overall assistance to consumers).  
 169. For example, California was awarded $4,635,952. Ani Fete, Consumer 
Assistance Programs Get $20 Million from HHS, ENROLL AMERICA (Aug. 30, 2012, 
3:28 PM), http://www.enrollamerica.org/blog/2012/08/consumer-assistance-
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Some states’ restrictions on consumer assistance go 
beyond a rejection of the ACA’s consumer assistance 
centers—Georgia and Illinois place restrictions on 
individuals and community groups that might attempt to 
help potential enrollees assess different coverage options.170 
Tennessee’s restrictions were so broad that a lawsuit 
resulted in an agreement that the restrictions would not be 
enforced so broadly.171    
c. Missing Information for Enforcement. To enforce the 
new rules and protect consumer rights, consumers must 
learn their rights and enforcement officials must know that 
a problem exists. States are meant to be the primary 
enforcers of compliance with health insurance market 
reforms, such as the new appeals process and others.172 
Where the states lack the authority or ability to enforce the 
provisions, enforcement is left to the federal government.  
For example, the ACA provides that individual and group 
health coverage must provide for external review of denied 
claims.173 The process is complex, and the vast majority of 
consumers never seek even an internal appeal of a denied 
claim. Most are completely unaware of any available 
consumer assistance.174 To remedy this situation, and to help 
consumers to understand and progress through the process, 
notices of claim denial (known as Explanations of Benefits or 
  
programs-get-20-million-from-hhs. It plans to “[p]artner with non-profit 
community-based organizations to provide direct, local consumer assistance;” 
“[c]reate appropriate, accessible health care consumer information and resources 
for seniors and Californians with disabilities;” and “[e]xpand existing resources 
and training materials for consumer assistance organizations[.]” Consumer 
Assistance Program Grants: How States Are Using New Resource to Give 
Consumers Greater Control of Their Health Care, supra note 168.  
 170. Giovannelli et al., supra note 147. 
 171. Id.; see Agreed Final Order, League of Women Voters of Tenn. v. McPeak, 
No. 13-1365-IV (Tenn. Ch. Oct. 7, 2013), available at http://www.tnjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Agreed-Final-Order-as-Entered.pdf. 
 172. See ACA §§ 2701, 2719; Compliance, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-
Market-Reforms/compliance.html [hereinafter CMS, Compliance]. 
 173. ACA § 2719(b). 
 174. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 163. 
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EOBs) must inform consumers about any available 
ombudsman or consumer assistance office created by the 
states under the ACA that can offer help.175  
When the state declines to set up such a consumer 
assistance center, the information on the EOB then directs 
consumers to the Department of Labor (“DOL”).176 The DOL 
will attempt to resolve the dispute through informal 
settlement procedures.177 There is, however, a bias against 
the federal government’s involvement with health insurance, 
particularly among Republicans,178 such that the federal 
  
 175. ACA § 2719; 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2719(b)(2)(ii)(E)(5) (2014) 
(“The plan and issuer must disclose the availability of, and contact information 
for, any applicable office of health insurance consumer assistance or ombudsman 
established under PHS Act section 2793 to assist individuals with the internal 
claims and appeals and external review processes.”). 
 176. DEP’T OF LABOR, TECHNICAL RELEASE 2011-01 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/tr11-01.pdf.  
 177. See, e.g., id. The DOL offers the following assistance with disputes:  
Complaints involving alleged violations of ERISA are handled by Benefit 
Advisors in our national and field offices. Those who file complaints with 
us can expect a prompt and courteous response from our staff. Every 
complaint received will be pursued and, if determined to be valid, 
resolution will be sought through informal dispute resolution. You can 
expect to receive a status report from the assigned benefits advisor every 
30 days. If your valid complaint cannot be resolved informally, it may be 
referred for further review by our enforcement staff. While we cannot 
ensure that every complaint will result in an investigation, at the 
conclusion of enforcement activity, if requested, we will furnish an 
understandable explanation of the outcome of our review and 
investigation.  
About the Employee Benefits Security Administration, DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/main.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 178. DROPP ET AL., supra note 101, at 15 (“Republicans have significantly less 
confidence in the successful implementation of the exchanges when told that they 
will be managed by the federal government. Republicans are more than twice as 
likely to exhibit confidence in state-run exchanges (43 percent) compared with 
federally-managed exchanges (20 percent).”). When asked whether the state or 
federal government should provide health insurance for low-income people, only 
about a quarter of the people said that the federal government should provide it 
(24% in Arkansas, 26% in Kentucky, 25% in Louisiana, 27% in North Carolina). 
The majority said that the state or local government should handle it (46% in 
Arkansas, 48% in Kentucky, 47% in Louisiana, 47% in North Carolina). N.Y. 
TIMES & THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., POLLS IN FOUR SOUTHERN STATES, 
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government may not to be the source that citizens turn to for 
information about insurance help. The absence of a state 
consumer assistance center coupled with this bias against 
federal help for such matters suggests that enforcement may 
be hobbled in these states. In this manner, the new appeal 
process, often lauded as one of the ACA’s greatest additions 
to the panoply of consumer protections,179 is undermined by 
lack of state participation. Notice of consumer assistance 
centers is particularly important, because studies such as the 
recent Kaiser Family Foundation report indicate that 
individuals often do not know when there is help available or 
how to find it.180 
Consumer assistance centers—which, as explained 
above, most states have refused—do not only disseminate 
information, but collect it too for purposes of enforcement. 
Consumer assistance center grants are conditioned upon the 
entity’s promise to collect information to be used for targeted 
enforcement.181 In these states, then, state officials have less 
  
6 [hereinafter Polls in Four Southern States], available at 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/8580-t2.pdf. 
 179. Candy Sagon, New Tools Help Fight Health Claim Denials, AARP BULL., 
Sept. 2010, at 4 (“Fighting back when your health insurance company denies a 
claim just got a little easier, thanks to federal rules recently issued under the 
healthcare overhaul law.”); Alison Young, Rules to Ease Consumer Appeals in 
Health Coverage, USA TODAY, July 23-25, 2010 at 3A. 
 180. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 163, at 4 (noting that most individuals surveyed 
did not know where to seek help and that the “burdens of illness made it harder 
to resolve problems on their own”). In the Kaiser report’s case studies, person 
after person reported that they did not know their state had a Consumer 
Assistance Program. Id. at 23 (“[Consumer] did not know her state has a 
Consumer Assistance Program that would help her file an appeal”); id. at 25 
(describing a consumer who wrote to his congressman and others for help but did 
not know his state had a Consumer Assistance Program that could have helped 
him with appeals). 
 181. Dept. of Health & Human Service, Affordable Care Act (ACA)—Consumer 
Assistance Program Grants, Initial Announcement Invitation to Apply for FY 2010 
3-7 (Jul. 2010) (“[Programs must] collect data on consumer inquiries and 
complaints to help the Secretary identify problems in the marketplace and 
strengthen enforcement . . . . States must demonstrate that designees can 
advocate freely and vigorously on behalf of consumers . . . [and] are capable of 
reporting objective data to the Secretary on the responsiveness of agencies that 
oversee private health insurance and group health plans and public 
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information regarding potential problems, and consumers 
are less likely to know their rights.  
The federal fallback remains an option, but can it really 
be effective? Its role is limited by logistical issues as well as 
state primacy in such matters—the measured approach to 
enforcement reflected in HHS’s statements reflects these 
limitations.182 The federal government’s approach to 
enforcement is incremental and careful out of fear of being 
labelled unconstitutional commandeering.183 Even so, the 
federal government’s role is necessary, given that Alabama, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming have all stated 
that they lack authority to enforce any ACA market 
reforms.184 
The federal government can enforce the market reforms 
either when a state indicates that it will not do so, or when it 
becomes apparent that “a State has failed to substantially 
enforce a provision” of the ACA involving “the issuance, sale, 
renewal, and offering of health insurance coverage in 
connection with group health plans or individual health 
insurance.”185 Federal intervention is permitted if a 
complaint is filed with the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services,186 if news media reports indicate a 
problem,187 or if “any other information” indicates that the 
state is not enforcing the market reforms.188 One 
commentator has described this process as “painfully” 
  
coverage . . . . There should be staff available to answer consumer calls in real 
time.”). 
 182. See CMS, Compliance, supra note 172. 
 183. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 178-79 (noting that “[t]he solution may be 
messy, but conceptually it hangs together . . . the approach is at least conceptually 
workable”). 
 184. CMS, Compliance, supra note 172.  
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22(a)(2) (2012). The Public Health Service Act explains 
the Secretary’s and the federal enforcement powers, which can involve civil money 
penalties and a means for determining liability. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 
180 n.67 (noting that states retain the sole power to act upon the issuer’s license).  
 186. 45 C.F.R. § 150.205(a) (2014). 
 187. Id. § 150.205(c); see id. § 150.101 (providing that CMS has jurisdiction over 
the market reforms). 
 188. Id. § 150.205(f). 
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deferential to the states.189 Even when a problem is 
uncovered, the process still returns to the state to determine 
“whether the affected individual or entity has made 
reasonable efforts to exhaust available State remedies.”190 
The enforcement process itself is equally deferential to 
the states. Enforcement begins by consulting with the state 
in question.191 Not only is enforcement deferential and 
protracted, but it is hard to even find in the first instance. 
The CMS website provides a lengthy explanation of its 
partnership with the states,192 but this is hardly comforting if 
one lives in a state such as Texas, which has already sworn 
to resist the ACA as much as possible.193 The mere presence 
of this federal fall-back system, though, may serve a 
deterrent function of some sort.194 However, by cutting off 
information to consumers and declining to accept awards 
that require the collection of consumer complaint 
information, the anti-ACA states have lessened the 
likelihood that any complaints will come to light, or that 
consumers will even know that they have grounds for a 
complaint. 
  
 189. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 181.  
 190. 45 C.F.R. § 150.209; Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 181 (“[E]ven when 
evidence of nonenforcement surfaces, the regulations throw the matter back into 
the very state system whose allege failure is the subject of the third-party 
evidence.”). 
 191. 45 C.F.R. §§ 150.211-221 (explaining the process of notice to state officials, 
a thirty-day wait for a response with an option to extend the time to respond, an 
initial determination and additional time for the state to show substantial 
enforcement, and then a final determination as to whether CMS will intervene in 
the process).  
 192. See, e.g., State Health Insurance Marketplaces, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/
state-marketplaces.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 193. See Letter from Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., to Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. 
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. (July 9, 2012), available at http://gov.texas.gov/
files/press-office/O-SebeliusKathleen201207090024.pdf (“I stand proudly with 
the growing chorus of governors who reject the PPACA power grab. Thank God 
and our nation's founders that we have the right to do so.”); Rosenbaum, supra 
note 104, at 182-83 (“If problems are uncovered, CMS notes that it will ‘work 
cooperatively’ with the state (the same state that notified CMS that it would not 
enforce the law) to ‘ensure compliance.’”). 
 194. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 183. 
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One of the ACA’s foundational principles is that 
informational transparency would aid consumers by 
facilitating consumer understanding and enrollment, giving 
consumers a chance to push back against unreasonable rate 
reviews, and permitting precise enforcement of consumer 
protections. Taken together, the rejections of consumer 
information transparency provisions emerge as a campaign 
potentially comparable in its effects to the rejection of the 
Medicaid expansion, yet operating with little fanfare and 
without the stakeholder resistance that the rejection of 
Medicaid’s expansion has attracted. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATES’ ACA INFORMATION 
 BLOCKADE & POSSIBLE AMELIORATIONS 
The ACA’s implementation is evolving, and its status 
changes daily. The full effect of the states’ resistance to 
consumer information provisions will not be known for years, 
or even decades. Already, however, some implications of the 
states’ consumer information blockade can be seen.  
A. The Federal Fallback Undermined  
In states declining to host exchanges, expand Medicaid, 
and enforce market reforms, the federal fallback is crucial for 
individuals to claim the ACA benefits to which they are 
entitled. ACA provisions involving information 
dissemination and transparency, such as those addressing 
creation and promotion of exchanges, enforcement of market 
reforms, and others, are among those with a federal fallback. 
But in states where the federal fallback is necessary, citizens 
are less receptive to the ACA (in part due to a lack of factually 
correct information about the ACA)195 and to federal help, 
thereby limiting the federal fallback’s effectiveness.  
When the federal government takes over traditional 
state functions such as the regulation of health insurance 
and the enforcement of related consumer rights, the states 
are effectively ceding this ground to the federal government 
by allowing the federal fallback to apply, thereby permitting 
  
 195. See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
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a soft federal takeover of those areas.196 But in the states that 
resist the ACA by declining the Medicaid expansion and 
refusing exchanges, how effective is this fallback likely to be? 
Will the federal government be able to enter those fields and 
overcome these states’ hostility to the ACA and federal 
intervention? 
The effectiveness of the federal fallback depends in part 
on the willingness of citizens to accept the ACA and to turn 
to the federal government instead of their state government 
for help. State resistance to the ACA tends to follow along 
party lines—the ACA is very unpopular with Republican 
voters, who traditionally dislike large federal programs and 
have greater faith in their state government.197 In polls, 
Republicans held much more negative views than Democrats 
of the ACA, and Republicans also hold more negative views 
of the federal government itself.198 Significantly, when asked 
about their confidence that an exchange program would 
succeed, Republicans were much less confident about the 
program when they were told the federal government would 
implement it than they were when told the state government 
would do so.199 Indeed, 79% of Republicans polled professed to 
be “not too confident” or “not at all confident” that a health 
insurance exchange would be successfully implemented if the 
implementation were conducted by the federal 
government.200 That number dropped to 57% when the 
program was described as being implemented by the states.201 
Democrats, on the other hand, were more confident in the 
  
 196. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 72, at 587 (“At the same time, 
however, in those states that opt out of the federal program, the federal 
government steps in to take over what was often previously an area of state 
dominion (for example, health insurance) and does so in a more subtle way than 
taking over the entire system at once.”). 
 197. Bill Barrow, Obamacare Faces Near-Solid Block in the South, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 30, 2013, 3:53 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/03/30/obamacare-block_n_2985587.html (quoting Republican pollster Whit 
Ayers as describing the law as “toxic among Republican primary voters”). 
 198. DROPP ET AL., supra note 101.  
 199. Id. at 2. 
 200. Id. at 10, 11.  
 201. Id. at 11. 
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exchange program when it was described as a federal 
program—just 24% were not confident it would succeed, with 
34% not confident that state implementation would 
succeed.202 This lack of confidence can lead to further distrust 
of the ACA and the federal government.203 That is, 
Republicans have less faith in federal government to begin 
with, so by placing the ACA in federal hands, the ACA is 
undermined from the start and thus less likely to succeed, 
further confirming the initial bias.204  
In addition, the ACA’s framing in the public discourse 
can affect people’s perception of the law and the choices that 
they make.205 A recent Kaiser poll indicates that even in the 
four Republican-dominated states studied, a clear majority of 
individuals tend to believe that the government should be 
responsible for providing health insurance for low-income 
people.206 Yet about half the people polled in these states did 
not know or denied that the ACA provides such help to low-
income people.207 Despite lacking this crucial piece of 
information about the law, wide majorities polled in these 
  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 17 (predicting “increased political polarization and distrust of the 
federal government”). 
 204. See id. at 4; see also Jonathan Bernstein, 1. Undermine health care reform 
2. Complain it doesn’t work, WASH. POST (June 28, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/06/28/1-undermine-health-care-reform-2-
complain-it-doesnt-work. 
 205. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 458 (1981) (noting that “the susceptibility 
of preferences to variations of framing raises doubt about the feasibility and 
adequacy of the coherence criterion” that the authors had adopted). 
 206. Polls in Four Southern States, supra note 178, at 6. In Arkansas, 70% of 
people surveyed said that the government at some level should provide health 
insurance for low-income people; and in Kentucky, North Carolina, and 
Louisiana, 74%, 74%, and 72%, respectively, of people polled said that 
government was responsible. Id.  
 207. Id. at 4. In Arkansas, 52% did not know or denied that the ACA provides 
financial help to low and moderate income Americans who don’t get insurance at 
work to help them purchase coverage; in Kentucky, 45%; in Louisiana, 56%; and 
in North Carolina, 48%. Id. 
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states disapproved or strongly disapproved of the ACA.208 In 
the same vein, citizens of Medicaid non-expansion states 
state that they favor Medicaid expansion and other key 
individual elements of the law (when presented in a question 
as a specific proposition and not as part of the ACA), even as 
they profess disapproval of the law as a whole.209 This 
approval of the law’s individual tenets together with 
disapproval of the law as a whole (when called by its popular 
name) suggests that opinions about the ACA are not based 
on factually-correct features of the law but are based on other 
factors.  
The exact reasons for this disconnect are hard to pin 
down precisely, but it may be no coincidence that these same 
states have some of the highest per capita spending on anti-
ACA advertising.210 In anti-ACA states, politicians’ rhetoric 
and negative advertising have affected citizens’ views of the 
ACA.211 According to some, the anti-ACA environment in the 
anti-ACA states has led some to believe that the ACA has 
been repealed.212 Social norms have been shown to influence 
individuals’ perception of their choices and to influence 
behavior in a number of different spheres.213  
Thus, even though individuals in southern states 
actually agree with many tenets of the ACA, the negative 
information is crowding out the factually correct information, 
  
 208. Id. Arkansas, 62% disapproved or disapproved strongly of the ACA; in 
Kentucky, 55%; in Louisiana, 59%; and in North Carolina, 54%. Id.  
 209. Michael Ollove, Despite Governors’ Opposition, Strong Southern Support 
for Medicaid Expansion, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/05/21/
despite-governors-opposition-strong-southern-support-for-medicaid-expansion. 
 210. Niam Yaraghi, Have the Anti-Obamacare Ads Backfired?, BROOKINGS (July 
9, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2014/07/9-anti-aca-ads-
backfire (“The four states with the highest per capita spending on anti-ACA ads 
are Kentucky, Arkansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina.”). 
 211. Galewitz, supra note 27.  
 212. Id. (“We run into people all the time who say, ‘I thought the law had been 
repealed,’ because all they hear is their congressman has voted for the 50th time 
to repeal the ACA.”). 
 213. See CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 34-35 (2009) (noting that people tend to 
conform their behavior to what they perceive to a norm—behaviors studied 
included college students’ drinking and tourists’ taking of petrified wood). 
468 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
such that the ACA emerges tainted and is not judged on a 
factually correct basis. 
B. Forgoing Benefits While Funding the Benefits of Others 
The states that suppress the informational transparency 
provisions of the ACA are condemning their citizens to fund 
the healthcare of those in other states while being less likely 
to claim their own benefits. Citizens of states that reject 
informational transparency provisions lose out in multiple 
ways, explained in turn below: (1) by being less likely to claim 
their benefits while continuing to be subject to federal taxes 
and the individual mandate’s penalty tax, which operate 
without state implementation; (2) by losing federal funds 
which would be spent of premium subsidies and cost sharing; 
and (3) by receiving less value for their health insurance 
dollar, because their states decline enforcement activities 
that would strengthen consumer protections. Some, but not 
all, of the repercussions of the anti-informational-
transparency stance are related to the lower ACA enrollment 
that characterizes these states.214 States can reject certain 
ACA provisions and avoid disseminating enrollment 
information about the ACA, as described above, but the 
revenue-raising portions of the ACA and the individual 
mandate’s penalty tax remain applicable in these states, 
independent of state implementation. In states rejecting the 
ACA, then, the citizens lose money at several levels—at the 
state level, when the state does not receive Medicaid monies, 
  
 214. States that have embraced the law by expanding Medicaid and creating 
their own exchanges have seen their rate of uninsured individuals drop by an 
average of 2.5%, from 16.1% uninsured to 13.6%, compared with a drop of 0.8%, 
from 18.7% to 17.9% uninsured, in states implementing neither or just one of 
these measures. Dan Witters, Uninsured Rate Drops More in States Embracing 
Health Law, GALLUP (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/168539/
uninsured-rates-drop-states-embracing-health-law.aspx. In states supporting the 
ACA with outreach and state-run exchanges, enrollment of the previously 
uninsured has progressed apace. In California, for example, a state with 7 million 
uninsured (the highest number in the country), more than 30% of those eligible 
for marketplace plans had enrolled as of March 17, 2014. Galewitz, supra note 27. 
In states openly hostile to the ACA, the situation is quite different. In Texas, a 
state with 6.2 million uninsured, fewer than 10% of those eligible had enrolled as 
of March 1, 2014. Id. 
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and at the individual level, when a lack of outreach and 
information results in fewer citizens’ obtaining health 
insurance and thereby failing to receive the federal subsidies. 
And, citizens who do not obtain health insurance are more 
likely to be subject to the penalty tax. 
As an initial matter, the non-expansion of Medicaid 
results in a large shift in funds from non-expansion states to 
expansion states.215 As explained above, however, the 
Medicaid expansion opposition is softening for this and other 
reasons. Medicaid expansion monies are, however, just part 
of the monies that states rejecting the ACA and shutting 
down related consumer information will lose.  
In addition to the loss of Medicaid monies, these states, 
due to their lower enrollment, will lose federal monies that 
would have been spent on premium subsidies and cost 
sharing.216 The premium subsidy and cost-sharing amounts 
are significant—starting at $5290 per subsidized enrollee in 
2014 and rising to $7900 in 2023.217 While a direct link 
between resistance to informational transparency provisions 
and lower enrollment is difficult to establish, the anti-ACA 
states have taken aim at exactly the mechanisms that would 
  
 215. States’ decisions to expand Medicaid or not results in a large shift in federal 
funds. One analysis finds that the 24 expanding states will received $30.3 billion 
new federal dollars, while those rejecting expansion will forego $35.0 billion in 
new federal dollars. Don Taylor, ACA: Self Imposed Redistribution from Poor to 
Rich States, FREEFORALL (Oct. 26, 2013), http://donaldhtaylorjr.wordpress.com/
2013/10/26/self-imposed-redistribution-from-poor-to-rich-states/#comments. 
 216. Henry J. Aaron, States Engaging in Fiscal Madness, BROOKINGS (Mar. 18, 
2014), http://brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/18-states-fiscal-madness-
medicaid-expansion-aaron (noting that non-expansion states such as Texas lose 
not only the federal funds they would have received for Medicaid, but must still 
subsidize the Medicaid expansion in other states by payment of federal taxes). 
Rejection of the Medicaid expansion itself results in a loss of $9.2 billion to the 
state of Texas by 2022. Id. The anti-ACA states are generally lower-income states 
with greater numbers of poor and uninsured people, so this use of the law in this 
way becomes regressive, disfavoring the poor and moving money to the richer 
states.  
 217. “In total, CBO estimates that the federal government will spend $5290 per 
subsidized enrollee in fiscal year 2014, rising to $7900 in fiscal year 2023. This 
includes spending for premium tax subsidies; cost-sharing subsidies; and, 
through 2014, related federal financial support to operate the exchanges.” James, 
Premium Tax Credits, supra note 11, at 2.  
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increase enrollment and help consumers obtain these 
subsidies; navigators, for example, whom anti-ACA states 
have burdened with additional requirements and 
restrictions, are charged with explaining tax subsidies to 
potential enrollees.218 By burdening navigators, the 
seventeen Republican-led states that enacted such 
regulations not only reduced the likelihood that their citizens 
would enroll in health insurance plans but also that they 
would learn about available federal tax credits. As explained 
above, one of the most significant stated reasons for declining 
to enroll in or even shop for health insurance is cost.219 And 
yet, the majority remain unaware of the federal tax credits 
for which they qualify.220 By interfering with the delivery of 
information about such tax credits, the states are further 
declining federal tax monies and discouraging citizens from 
enrolling in health insurance plans. In declining to operate 
consumer assistance centers set out in the ACA, states are 
also adding to their citizens’ tax burden by failing to provide 
help in obtaining premium credits on their taxes, as 
consumer assistance centers are required by law to do.221 
The individual mandate penalties will hit harder where 
campaigns against health transparency have depressed 
enrollment.222 Under the individual mandate, individuals 
  
 218. ACA § 1311(i)(3) (“An entity that serves as a navigator under a grant under 
this subsection shall . . . distribute fair and impartial information concerning 
enrollment in qualified health plans, and the availability of premium tax 
credits. . . .”). 
 219. ENROLL AMERICA, THE UNINSURED MIDWAY THROUGH ACA OPEN 
ENROLLMENT 3, 10 (2013), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.enroll
america.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Perry_Undem_Uninsured_Survey.pdf 
(noting that 69% of people who were uninsured did not have insurance because 
they could not afford it, yet 69% also did not know about available subsidies). 
 220. Id. at 2-5. 
 221. ACA § 2793(c)(5) (providing that the office of health insurance consumer 
assistance shall “resolve problems with obtaining premium tax credits under 
section 36B” of the Internal Revenue Code). 
 222. To encourage more Americans to carry health insurance, the ACA features 
both individual and employer mandates. The mandates are tied to penalties for 
failure to abide by the mandate, and these penalty payments help subsidize the 
health insurance premiums of lower-income Americans. In addition, the 
individual mandate discourages both the free rider problem and adverse 
selection, in which those with greater health problems would tend to enroll, while 
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must carry health insurance or face a penalty tax.223 The 
individual mandate is the centerpiece of the ACA, as it is the 
impetus for all individuals to ensure that they have 
insurance. Certain groups are excluded from the mandate;224 
these total about twenty-three million people who may not 
have insurance even after the ACA is fully implemented.225 
Large employers too are subject to a mandate, which requires 
that they either make affordable health insurance available 
or pay a penalty, starting in 2015.226 The individual mandate 
  
those without health problems would forgo enrollment, reasoning that they could 
enroll later without fear of being barred by pre-existing conditions. MCDONOUGH, 
supra note 9 at 121 (noting that “[v]oluntary systems create a ‘free rider’ problem, 
as some take advantage of services and benefits without contributing.”): Amy B. 
Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA, 
36 J. CORP. L. 781, 787 (2011) (noting that “[t]o combat this likelihood of adverse 
selection, the individual mandate seeks to get everyone, particularly healthy 
individuals” covered by health insurance). 
 223. ACA § 5000A. The penalty tax will be $695 per year in 2016, or one-twelfth 
of that amount for every month that the person fails to maintain minimal 
essential coverage. Id. § 5000A(c). The Act further provides that the amount of 
the penalty will increase each year after 2016 by a cost-of-living adjustment. 
Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(D). Starting in 2014, the penalty tax is phased in, with $95 per 
adult (up to $285 per family) or 1% of total income, whichever is greater. In 2015, 
the flat fee is $325 per adult (up to $975 per family) or 2% of family income, 
whichever is greater. Id. § 5000A(c). 
 224. Individuals are exempt from the penalty tax on the following bases: (1) 
religious objection; (2) membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe or 
eligibility for services through an Indian care provider; (3) income below the tax 
filing threshold; (4) a gap in coverage of less than three months; (5) a hardship 
resulting in inability to obtain coverage; (6) inability to afford health insurance 
such that the minimum amount the person must pay for the premiums is more 
than 8% of the person’s household income; (7) incarceration; or (8) status in the 
United States other than U.S. citizen, U.S. national or alien lawfully in the United 
States. Id. § 5000A(d)–(e).  
 225. MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 109-10. 
 226. In 2015 and after, large employers must pay a penalty if: 
(a) The employer does not offer health coverage or offers coverage to 
fewer than 95% of its full-time employees and the dependents of those 
employees, and at least one of the full-time employees receives a 
premium tax credit to help pay for coverage on a Marketplace; or (b) The 
employer offers health coverage to all or at least 95% of its full-time 
employees, but at least one full-time employee receives a premium tax 
credit to help pay for coverage on a Marketplace, which may occur 
because the employer did not offer coverage to that employee or because 
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and its associated individual penalty tax were set up not as 
revenue-raisers but as nudges to change behavior—namely, 
to buy health insurance.227  
But, particularly to people with lower incomes, the 
penalty tax represents a significant amount of money and is 
a regressive tax.228 While much of the ACA invites state 
implementation, the penalty tax does not.229 It is filed with an 
individual’s annual federal income tax statement.230 
  
the coverage the employer offered that employee was either unaffordable 
to the employee or did not provide minimum value.  
Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the 
Affordable Care Act, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-
Answers-on-Employer-Shared-Responsibility-Provisions-Under-the-Affordable-
Care-Act#Liability (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 227. MCDONOUGH, supra note 9, at 256. Because the penalty does not fit any 
known theory of taxation, commentators tend to view its main goal as affecting 
purchasing decisions Monahan, supra note 222, at 794 (noting that “this type of 
distribution does not fit within any known theories of the distribution of income 
tax burden. If it is to survive rational analysis, it must be because of its impact 
on purchasing decisions.”). Key revenue-raising sections in the ACA are set out 
in Title IX. Amounts raised range from $2.7 billion over ten years, see ACA § 
5000B, which imposes a tax on indoor tanning salons, to $210.2 billion over ten 
years, see id.§ 9014, which broadens the Medicare hospital insurance tax base for 
high-income taxpayers. The individual mandate’s penalty taxes are estimated to 
raise $45 billion over ten years, a sum that is not insignificant, but which was not 
the main purpose of the penalty. Rather, the penalty was intended to mitigate the 
problem of adverse selection—if insurance companies are required to guarantee 
the issue of health insurance to all comers, then people who are healthy could 
decide to wait until they are ill to obtain health insurance. Jeffrey H. Kahn, The 
Individual Mandate Tax Penalty, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 319, 332 (2014) 
(“Congress enacted the individual mandate in an attempt to avoid the adverse 
selection problem and nudge the healthy into the health insurance pools. The 
mandate accomplishes this by tilting the balance heavily towards buying health 
insurance for the vast majority of people.”). 
 228. The penalty tax is regressive in that individuals at the lower end of the 
income scale pay the greatest percentage of income as a penalty if they do not 
purchase health insurance. Monahan, supra note 222, at 793-94.  
 229. Morse, supra note 116. 
 230. Kahn, supra note 227, at 320. While non-payment of the penalty can be 
offset against any refund that would otherwise be due, the penalty tax cannot 
result in liens or criminal sanctions. ACA § 5000A(g)(2). 
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When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states could opt 
out of the Medicaid expansion,231 the Congressional Budget 
Office increased its projection of the number of people who 
would pay the penalty tax associated with being uninsured.232 
The CBO projected that two million more people would pay 
the penalty tax than if the states were required to expand 
Medicaid.233 In addition, greater numbers of people will be 
subject to the penalty tax due to the lower enrollment in the 
states that have rejected Medicaid, refused to create 
exchanges, and rejected consumer information transparency 
provisions. 
While the state governments may have legitimate 
reasons for rejecting the approach to healthcare reform 
represented by the ACA, the ACA is the law, such that even 
citizens of anti-ACA states have legitimate benefits that they 
should be able to access. Currently, citizens are extremely 
confused about the ACA, and this confusion increases as 
socioeconomic status and current access to health insurance 
decline.234  
Finally, when consumers lack access to information 
about enforcement information—as is the case when the 
states decline to provide consumer assistance or enforcement 
of market reforms—and states, in turn, are not collecting 
information about the issues consumers face, then consumers 
  
 231. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-09 (2012). 
 232. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING 
UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-19-12-Indiv_
Mandate_Penalty.pdf. 
 233. Id. at 1. Of those projected to pay the penalty tax, 600,000 have incomes of 
less than 100% of the federal poverty level, 1.2 million have incomes of between 
100 and 200% of the federal poverty level, 1.2 million have incomes of between 
200 and 300% of the federal poverty level, 1.1 million have incomes of less 
between 300 and 400% of the federal poverty level, 600,000 have incomes of 
between 400 and 500% of the federal poverty level, and 1.2 million have incomes 
greater than 500% of the federal poverty level. Id. 
 234. As the 2013-14 open enrollment season approached, 59% of people overall 
knew that the ACA was the law of the land and would be implemented, while that 
number sank to 42% when only people with household incomes of less than 
$30,000 per year were included. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: April 2013, supra 
note 27.  
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are receiving less value for their health insurance and tax 
dollars. That is, they are paying, albeit indirectly, for the 
ACA’s provisions, but they do not receive the full value that 
consumers in more enforcement-oriented states receive.  
C. Rectifying the Information Gap 
Diverse actors, including Congress, federal agencies, 
state governments, and private health insurance companies, 
will need to act in order to close the information gap. 
Legislators at the federal level have long sought uniform 
regulation in areas that might result in a race between the 
states to the regulatory bottom in order to attract businesses 
seeking relative freedom from regulation.235 These provisions 
of the ACA are in danger of becoming just such an area, 
where citizens are not protected unless more uniform laws 
are put in place, or state governments move to ensure that 
their citizens receive the equal benefits of this new law. 
Nevertheless, broad Congressional action to promote the 
ACA remains unlikely in the near term.  
More modest steps, however, could include Congress 
providing further funds to establish, continue, and promote 
Consumer Assistance Centers. This would shore up a means 
of assisting consumers with healthcare literacy, claims and 
appeals processes, and the collection of information to further 
enforcement of the ACA’s consumer protections. Without 
  
 235. The Clean Air Act is one such example. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of 
Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1195 (1995) 
(“Congress’s widely repeated justification for preempting less stringent state 
ambient air quality standards and certain stationary source emission standards, 
and for creating the mandatory PSD program, was the states’ natural tendency 
to compete in a “race-to-the-bottom” for business. Because of their willingness to 
relax environmental standards to attract or keep economic development, states 
could not be trusted to adopt adequate standards.”). The credit card industry is 
another example. When the Supreme Court permitted companies to use 
nationwide the usury laws of their home states, the states competed to have the 
least restrictive usury laws, with South Dakota, Delaware and others completely 
doing away with ceilings on interest rates. MATTHEW SHERMAN, CTR. FOR ECON. & 
POLICY RESEARCH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/a-
short-history-of-financial-deregulation-in-the-united-states (follow “PDF” link). 
Credit card companies immediately moved their operations to these states. See 
id.  
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proper funding, this program cannot fulfill its potential, even 
with regard to those states inclined to apply for such funds.  
In addition, state navigator restrictions must be closely 
watched to see if they, as implemented, prevent navigators 
from carrying out their duties. In its most recent regulation, 
HHS noted that it would monitor state laws regulating 
navigators and potentially undermining navigators’ 
eligibility and ability to perform their intended function.236 
HHS has, at this time, declined to enumerate all the 
potentially-harmful state laws and requirements but states 
that it “has monitored, and will continue to monitor” non-
federal requirements imposed on navigators and other 
assistance personnel.237 
Significantly, however, those groups and lobbyists who 
advocate for the expansion of Medicaid should also advocate 
for greater information access so that citizens can access the 
benefits to which they are entitled. Medicaid expansion is of 
course a crucial means of expanding access to healthcare. But 
apart from Medicaid expansion, many more Americans may 
choose to access existing benefits if only more information 
were available.  
CONCLUSION 
Reforming the American healthcare system of course 
takes time.238 The ACA should be judged in terms of decades 
rather than years.239 Some predict that over the next years 
and decades, the ACA will in the end be fully implemented, 
just as Medicaid, passed in 1965, was eventually 
implemented in recalcitrant states such as Arizona, but not 
until 1982.240 Perhaps, as with Medicaid, the ACA will simply 
  
 236. 45 C.F.R. § 155.210-215. 
 237. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange and Insurance 
Market Standards for 2015 and Beyond, 79 Fed. Reg. 30,240, 30,274 (2014) (to be 
codified at scattered parts of 45 C.F.R.). 
 238. EMANUEL, supra note 98, at 291 (noting that reform of such a large 
healthcare system cannot be done overnight or even in one or two years). 
 239. See id.  
 240. Rosenbaum, supra note 104, at 171 (urging a federal fall-back for the 
Medicaid expansion). 
476 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
take time to grow in popularity and to be fully implemented 
in all the states. 
Much of the focus regarding the ACA’s implementation 
has been on the refusal of certain states to expand Medicaid, 
and rightly so. But the consumer information transparency 
provisions are crucial too—consumers are confused by the 
ACA and often put off by the negative information they have 
heard originating from political sources. Misinformation 
about the law is particularly acute among those with lower 
incomes and, therefore, less access to health insurance—the 
people who most need information about their rights under 
the ACA. 
 
 
 
